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Abstract
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the rst-price auction
with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when bidders have
independent subjective prior beliefs about the value distributions of the other bidders, computing
an Y-equilibrium of the auction is PPAD-complete, and computing an exact equilibrium is FIXP-
complete.
1 Introduction
Auctions are prime examples of economic environments in which the element of strategic behavior
is prevalent. e associated theory can be traced back to as early as the 1960s and the seminal work
of Vickrey [1961]. Over the years, auction theory and mechanism design have produced some of the
most celebrated results in economics, as can be evidenced, e.g., by the relevant 1996, 2007 and 2020
Nobel Prizes.
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Among the plethora of auction formats that this rich literature has proposed, some stand
out, such as the second-price auction of Vickrey [1961] or the revenue-maximizing auction of Myerson
[1981].
Arguably, though, the most fundamental auction format is that of the rst-price auction, in which the
highest bidder wins and is charged an amount equal to her bid. Compared to its counterparts mentioned
above, the rst-price auction does not enjoy the same desirable incentive properties: participants may
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have an incentive to misreport their true bids. At the same time, however, the rst-price auction is very
natural and simple to describe, implement and participate in, making it very suitable for a range of
important applications. As a maer of fact, several online ad exchanges, including Google Ad Manager,
have adopted this auction format for selling their ads, which has been coined “the rst-price movement”
(see, e.g., [Digiday.com, 2019; Paes Leme et al., 2020]).
ere has been a large body of work studying incentives and bidding behavior in rst-price auctions,
dating back to the original paper of Vickrey [1961]. In particular, the literature has studied the equilibria
of the auction in an incomplete information seing where the bidders have only probabilistic prior beliefs
(or simply priors) about the values of other bidders, via the lens of Bayesian game theory [Harsanyi,
1967] (see also [Myerson, 1997; Hartline, 2012]). Several dierent scenarios of interest have been
analyzed; see, e.g., [Criesmer et al., 1967; Riley and Samuelson, 1981; Plum, 1992; Marshall et al., 1994;
Lebrun, 1996, 1999; Maskin and Riley, 2000; Lizzeri and Persico, 2000; Athey, 2001; Reny and Zamir,
2004; Chawla and Hartline, 2013; Bergemann et al., 2017]. It is no exaggeration to say that understanding
the Bayes-Nash equilibria of the rst-price auction has historically been one of the most important
questions of auction theory.
e aforementioned literature has been primarily concerned with identifying conditions under
which (pure Bayes-Nash) equilibria are guaranteed to exist. Among those, the seminal paper of Athey
[2001] has been pivotal in establishing the existence of equilibria for fairly general seings with
continuous priors. A natural follow-up question posed explicitly by Athey [2001], which was also very
much present in earlier works, is whether these equilibria can also be “found”; in the context of the
related literature, this is usually interpreted as coming up with closed-form solutions that describe
them.
One of the most signicant contributions of computer science to the eld of game theory is to
formalize and systematically study this notion of “nding” or “computing” equilibria in games. Roughly
speaking, an equilibrium can be eciently computed if it can be found using a limited number of
standard operations that can be performed by a computer, where “limited” here typically means a
number which is a polynomial function of the size of the input parameters.
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In perhaps the most
important result in computational game theory, Daskalakis et al. [2009] proved that in all likelihood,
Nash equilibria of general games cannot always be computed eciently. In particular, they proved that
the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium is complete for the class PPAD [Papadimitriou, 1994],
which is widely believed to include problems that are computationally hard to solve.
In this paper, we study the complexity of computing an equilibrium of the rst-price auction, in
seings with continuous priors and discrete bids. We oer the following main result.
Informal eorem 1. Computing a (pure, Bayes-Nash) equilibrium of a rst-price auction with continu-
ous subjective priors and discrete bids is PPAD-complete.
is result can be interpreted intuitively as justication of why research in economics has only had
limited success in providing closed forms or characterizations for the equilibria of the rst-price auction.
In addition, we consider it to be a quite valuable addition to the literature of total search problems
[Megiddo and Papadimitriou, 1991], as it concerns the computation of equilibria of one of the most
fundamental games in auction theory.
1.1 Discussion and Further Results
Below, we provide a more in-depth discussion of our main result and its assumptions, as well as some
other related results that we obtain along the way.
Continuous Priors, Discrete Bids. Informal eorem 1 applies to the case where the bidders’ beliefs
about the values of other bidders are continuous distributions, whereas the bidding space is a discrete set.
e former assumption is standard in auction theory (see, e.g., [Myerson, 1997, Sec. 3.11] or [Krishna,
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2009]). From a technical standpoint, this also guarantees the existence of equilibria [Athey, 2001].
3
e assumption of the discrete bidding space is clearly motivated by any real-world scenario, in which
the bids will be increments of some minimum monetary amount, e.g., 1 dollar or 1 cent, depending
on the application. is seing has in fact been studied in several works for rst-price auctions in
particular (see, e.g., [Chwe, 1989; Athey, 2001; Escamocher et al., 2009; Cai et al., 2010; Rasooly and
Gavidia-Calderon, 2021]).
Subjective Priors. In Informal eorem 1 we assume that the priors are subjective, meaning that two
dierent bidders might have dierent beliefs about the values of some other bidder. In the auction
theory literature, it is oen assumed that a “universal” prior exists, which is common knowledge
among all players; this is known as the independent private values model. Indeed, such common priors
are quite convenient in seings where there is an aggregate objective that needs to be optimized in
expectation (e.g., the social welfare or the seller’s revenue), since it can be used by the designer to tune
the parameters of the auction in a way that works best for the optimization goal at hand; this is the
case, e.g., for Myerson’s revenue-maximizing auction [Myerson, 1981].
From our perspective however, where the goal is to study the players’ incentives and compute
an equilibrium, we believe it is natural to make the more general assumption that priors are still
independent, but subjective: this is enough for the bidders to come up with their best responses. As a
maer of fact, Harsanyi’s original paper [Harsanyi, 1967], as well as classic textbooks in economics (e.g.,
[Myerson, 1997; Jehle and Reny, 2001]) introduce Bayesian games directly in the context of subjective
beliefs.
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Similar notions of subjective priors and “subjective equilibria” have also been studied rather
extensively for general Bayesian games in economics [Hahn, 1973; Fudenberg and Levine, 1986; Baigalli
and Guaitoli, 1997; Baigalli et al., 1992; Kalai and Lehrer, 1993, 1995; Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1994]
and computer science [Witkowski and Parkes, 2012; Frongillo and Witkowski, 2016].
e subjective priors assumption is necessary for our PPAD-hardness result, but we would of course
be very interested in seling the complexity for the case of common priors as well. In fact, as we explain
in Section 7, we consider this to be one of the most important open problems in computational game
theory. us, besides being of standalone interest, one can also see our result for subjective priors as an
important rst step in the quest of answering this question. We remark that our PPAD-membership
result obviously applies to common priors, as this is just a special case of subjective beliefs.
Approximate Equilibria. While Informal eorem 1 states the PPAD-completeness of computing
an equilibrium of the rst-price auction, the formal statement is in fact about Y-equilibria, i.e., stable
states in which bidders do not wish to unilaterally deviate unless they are beer o by some small
positive quantity Y. As we explain in Section 2, this is very much necessary: there are examples where
the equilibrium is irrational, and therefore cannot be computed exactly in many standard models of
computation. As a maer of fact, this is a common theme in most papers in equilibrium computation;
see, e.g., [Daskalakis et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009] or the survey of Goldberg [2011] for a related
discussion.
Of course, the focus on Y-equilibria is only relevant for the membership result in PPAD; the com-
putational hardness result for approximate equilibria is clearly stronger. In fact, we show that under
some standard assumptions (see Section 2), the problem is PPAD-hard even when Y is allowed to be
a (suciently small) constant, independent of the input parameters. is is the strongest type of
PPAD-hardness one could hope for. For the computation of exact equilibria, Etessami and Yannakakis
[2010] dened the computational class FIXP. At a high level, this class contains problems that can be
stated as computations of (possibly irrational) xed points of functions dened by means of arithmetic
circuits (see [Yannakakis, 2009]). We complement our main result about Y-equilibria with the following
analogous result on exact ones:
3
It is important to note here that in some versions of the problem, even mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to
exist; see, e.g., [Lebrun, 1996].
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Informal eorem 2. Computing an exact (pure, Bayes-Nash) equilibrium of a rst-price auction with
continuous subjective priors and discrete bids is FIXP-complete.
One way to interpret a FIXP-completeness result in the standard computational (Turing) model
is in terms of strong vs weak approximations. A weak approximation is an Y-equilibrium as dened
above and is captured by our PPAD-completeness result. A strong approximation is a set of strategies
represented by rational numbers, which are “Y-close” to an exact equilibrium (in terms of the max
norm), and is captured by our FIXP-completeness result. We remark that this is completely analogous
to the computation of Nash equilibria in general games, see [Etessami and Yannakakis, 2010; Garg et al.,
2016a] for a more in-depth discussion.
e Meaning of PPAD-completeness. As we mentioned earlier, a PPAD-hardness result is inter-
preted as an indication that the problem cannot be solved in polynomial time. In particular, it is as
hard as nding Nash equilibria in general games [Daskalakis et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009; Mehta, 2014;
Rubinstein, 2018], market equilibria in Arrow-Debreu markets [Vazirani and Yannakakis, 2011; Chen
et al., 2017] or solutions to xed point theorems [Papadimitriou, 1994; Goldberg and Hollender, 2019].
Additionally, PPAD has been shown to be hard under various cryptographic assumptions (e.g., see
[Bitansky et al., 2015; Garg et al., 2016b; Choudhuri et al., 2019; Rosen et al., 2021]), meaning that solving
a PPAD-hard problem would “break” those assumptions as well. On the other hand, an “in PPAD” result
can be interpreted as the existence of an (inecient) algorithm that uses a path-following argument to
reach a solution.
An Ecient Algorithm. Besides our main PPAD- and FIXP-completeness results, we identify a
special case of the problem which can be solved eciently, namely when the number of bidders and the
size of the bidding space are constant, and the value distributions are “suciently smooth”, in the sense
that they are given by piecewise polynomial functions. To this end, we have the following theorem.
Informal eorem 3. A (pure, Bayes-Nash) equilibrium of the rst-price auction can be computed in
polynomial time when there is a constant number of bidders, a constant-size bidding space, and continuous
(subjective) priors which are piecewise polynomial functions.
Informal eorem 3 complements our PPAD- and FIXP-hardness results rather tightly, as our
reductions use a constant bidding space and very simple, piecewise constant distributions, but a large
number of bidders.
1.2 Related Work
As we mentioned earlier, there is a signicant amount of work in economic theory on the equilibria of
the rst-price auction [Criesmer et al., 1967; Riley and Samuelson, 1981; Plum, 1992; Marshall et al.,
1994; Lebrun, 1996, 1999; Maskin and Riley, 2000; Lizzeri and Persico, 2000; Athey, 2001; Reny and
Zamir, 2004; Bergemann et al., 2017]. Among those, the most relevant work to us is that of Athey [2001],
who established the existence of pure Bayes-Nash equilibria in games with discontinuous payos which
satisfy the single crossing property of Milgrom and Shannon [1994], of which the rst-price auction is a
special case. Athey’s proof applies to both discrete and continuous bidding spaces, and in fact the laer
is established through the former, via a limit argument similar in spirit to [Lebrun, 1996; Maskin and
Riley, 2000].
To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few prior works on the computational complexity of
equilibria in rst-price auctions. Escamocher et al. [2009] study the problem of computing equilibria
when both the priors and the bidding space are discrete. In that case, it is not hard to construct counter-
examples that show that pure equilibria may not exist, and therefore they are concerned with the
question of deciding their existence. eir results do not provide a conclusive answer (i.e., neither
NP-hardness nor polynomial-time solvability is proven), except for the very special case of two bidders
with bi-valued distributions. Wang et al. [2020] very recently studied the equilibrium computation
problem in seings with discrete priors and continuous bids (in a sense, the opposite of what we do
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here), and under the Vickrey tie-breaking rule for deciding the winner of the auction in case of a tie.
According to this rule, ties are resolved by running an auxiliary second-price (Vickrey) auction among
the potential winners of the rst-price auction; eectively this allocates the item to the bidder with
highest true valuation. is tie-breaking rule was introduced by Maskin and Riley [2000] primarily as a
technical tool in proving their existence results for the uniform tie-breaking rule, where ties are broken
uniformly at random among the bidders with the highest bid. Our results are proven for the uniform
tie-breaking rule, which is the standard rule in the literature of the problem [Lebrun, 1996; Maskin and
Riley, 2000; Athey, 2001; Krishna, 2009].
Finally, we remark that while we consider an equilibrium computation seing, our results are
markedly dierent from other works on such problems, e.g., [Daskalakis et al., 2009]. is is because it
concerns a much more specic and structured game, and crucially, a game which is Bayesian, which is
not the case for most prior work. Conceptually closer to our work is the paper by Cai and Papadimitriou
[2014] who study the complexity of Bayesian combinatorial auctions, a more complicated auction format
which typically involves multiple items for sale and more complex agents’ valuations over subsets of
items. e complexity of general Bayesian games (beyond auctions) has been studied in the literature,
primarily resulting in NP-hardness results for several cases of interest, e.g., see [Golob et al., 2007;
Conitzer and Sandholm, 2008].
2 Model and Notation
In a (Bayesian) rst-price auction (FPA), there is a set # = {1, 2, . . . , =} of bidders (or players) and one
item for sale. Each player 8 submits a bid 18 ∈ , where the bidding space  ⊆ [0, 1] is a nite set. We
will also make the standard assumption (oen referred to as the “null bid” in the literature) that 0 ∈ ,
which can be interpreted as the option of the bidders to not participate in the auction (see, e.g., [Maskin
and Riley, 2000; Athey, 2001]).
e item is allocated to the player with the highest bid, who is charged a payment equal to her bid.
If there are multiple players submiing the same highest bid, the winner is determined based on the
uniform tie-breaking rule. Formally, for a bid prole b = (11, . . . , 1=), the ex-post utility of player 8 with
true value E8 is given by
D̃8 (b ; E8) ≡
{
1
|, (b) | (E8 − 18), if 8 ∈, (b),
0, otherwise,
where , (b) = argmax
9 ∈#
1 9 (1)
For each pair of players 8, 9 ∈ # , 8 ≠ 9 , there is a continuous value distribution 8, 9 over [0, 1]; we
call this distribution the prior of bidder 8 over the values of bidder 9 . e subjective belief of player 8 for
the values v−8 = (E1, . . . , E8−1, E8+1, . . . , E=) of the other bidders is then given by the product distribution
L−8 ≡ ×9≠88, 9 . In other words, from the perspective of bidder 8 , the values E 9 for 9 ≠ 8 are drawn
independently from distributions 8, 9 . Notice that the special case where 8, 9 = 8′, 9 for all 9 ∈ # and
8, 8 ′ ∈ # \ { 9} corresponds to the classic independent private values model of auction theory, where the
value of each bidder is drawn (independently of the others) from a single distribution. More formally,
simplifying the notation by using  9 instead of 8, 9 , v is drawn from the common prior distribution
L = ×8∈# 8 . Obviously, while our hardness results rely on the fact that priors are subjective, all of our
positive results trivially extend to the case of common priors as well.
e FPA described above naturally induces a game in which each bidder 8 selects her bid based on
her own (true) value E8 , and her beliefs L−8 . A strategy of bidder 8 is a function V8 : [0, 1] →  mapping
values to bids. Given a strategy prole #−8 of the other players, the (ex-interim) utility of player 8 with
true value E8 when bidding 1 ∈  is
D8 (1, #−8 ; E8) ≡ Ev−8∼L−8 [D̃8 (1, #−8 (v−8); E8)] ,
where #−8 (v−8) is a shorthand for (V1(E1), . . . , V8−1(E8−1), V8+1(E8+1), · · · , V= (E=)). Intuitively, the player
calculates her (expected) utility by drawing a value E 9 for each bidder 9 ≠ 8 from her corresponding
5
subjective prior distribution 8, 9 , and then using the strategy “rules” #−8 of the others to map their
values to actual bids in .
We are interested in “stable” states of the FPA, i.e., strategy proles from which no bidder would
like to unilaterally deviate to a dierent strategy. Formally, we have the following denition.
Denition 1 (Y-Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the FPA). Let Y > 0. A strategy prole # = (V1, . . . , V=) is a
(pure, ex-interim) Y-Bayes-Nash equilibrium (Y-BNE) of the FPA if for any bidder 8 ∈ # and any value
E8 ∈ [0, 1],
D8 (V8 (E8), #−8 ; E8) ≥ D8 (1, #−8 ; E8) − Y for all 1 ∈ .





 D8 (V8 (E8), #−8 ; E8) ≥ max
1∈
D8 (1, #−8 ; E8) − Y for all E8 ∈ [0, 1]
}
Using this, the condition in Denition 1 can be equivalently wrien as V8 ∈ 'Y8 (#−8) for all players 8 .
For the special case of Y = 0, i.e. exact best-responses, we will drop the Y superscript.
Notice that, in Denition 1 we dene a relaxed equilibrium concept, in which the bidder does not
want to change to a dierent strategy unless it increases her utility by an additive factor larger than Y;
obviously, when Y = 0 we recover the standard denition of the (exact) Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
No Overbidding. As part of our model, we will make the assumption that bidders will never submit
a bid 18 which is higher than their valuation E8 . is is a standard assumption in the literature of the
rst-price auction [Maskin and Riley, 2000, 2003; Lebrun, 2006; Escamocher et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2020]
and auctions in general [Caragiannis et al., 2015; Lucier and Borodin, 2010; Bhawalkar and Roughgarden,
2011; Feldman et al., 2020; Christodoulou et al., 2016; Leme and Tardos, 2010]. e rationale behind it
stems from the fact that, given the format of the utilities in the FPA (see (1)), it is arguably unreasonable
to overbid, as bidding 0 will always result in at least the same utility. In game-theoretic terms, the
overbidding strategy is weakly dominated by bidding 0, which can be interpreted as abstaining from the
auction. ese strategies are typically excluded from consideration to rule out unnatural equilibria (see
[Feldman et al., 2020] for a discussion).
We are now ready to formally dene our computational problem of nding an equilibrium of the FPA:
9-Bayes-Nash Eqilibrium in the First-Price Auction (9-BNE-FPA)
Input:
- a set of bidders # = {1, 2, . . . , =};
- a nite bidding space  ⊆ [0, 1];
- for each pair of bidders 8, 9 ∈ # , a continuous value distribution 8, 9 over [0, 1].
Output: An Y-Bayes-Nash equilibrium # = (V1, . . . , V=).
We will use the term exact-BNE-FPA instead of 0-BNE-FPA to denote the computational problem
of nding an exact Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the auction. Some remarks related to the denition above
are in order.
e Input Model for the Distributions. We have intentionally vaguely stated that the distributions
8, 9 should be provided as input to the problem, but we have not specied exactly how. Our positive
results hold even when the functions 8, 9 are fairly general, and can be concisely and eciently
represented in a form that is appropriate for computation. In the interest of clarity, we omit the
technical details here, and we refer the reader to Appendix A where we provide all the details of the
input model. For the negative results on the other hand, we use fairly simple distributions 8, 9 – this
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only makes our results stronger. In particular, we use piecewise-constant density functions, which can
be represented by the endpoints and the value for each interval.
Explicit Bidding Space. We assume that the bidding space is explicitly given as part of the input.
is assumption is required in Section 3 in order to show that we can compute best-responses eciently.
Even in the mildest of seings where the bidding space is given implicitly, computing best-responses
turns out to be computationally and information-theoretically hard. We show this in Appendix B.
Equilibrium Representation. Besides the representation of the input, the output of our computa-
tional problem, i.e., the equilibrium of the FPA, should also be represented in some concise and ecient
way. Following the standard literature of the problem, we will consider equilibria for which the strategy
V8 (E8) of each bidder is a non-decreasing function of her value E8 (e.g., see [Athey, 2001; Maskin and
Riley, 2000; Reny and Zamir, 2004] and [Krishna, 2009, Appendix G]) for which the existence of an
equilibrium is always guaranteed [Athey, 2001]. ese equilibria are in a sense the only “natural” ones,
as, similar to the case of overbidding (see earlier discussion), any bidder’s strategy is weakly dominated
by a non-decreasing strategy.
Based on this, there is a straightforward and computationally ecient way of representing the best
response of each player, as a step function with a nite set of “jump points”, corresponding to the values
at which the bidder “jumps” from one bid to the next [Athey, 2001]. Formally, we dene
U8 (1) = sup {E | V8 (E) ≤ 1 } . (2)
Intuitively, U8 (1) is the largest value for which player 8 would bid 1 or lower. With a slight abuse of
notation, we can write U8 = V
−1
8 , that is, U8 can be interpreted as an inverse bidding strategy. In that way,
we can also rework V8 from U8 , as V8 (E) = 1, where E ∈ (U8 (1−), U8 (1)] for any 1 ∈ . Here we let 1−
denote the previous bid, i.e., the largest 1 ′ ∈  with 1 ′ < 1. Finally, to be able to handle the corner cases
in a unied way, we set 08 (1−) = 0 when 1 = 0 and U8 (1) = 1 when 1 = max.
In particular, this implies that bidding strategies are le-continuous (which is without loss of
generality given our value distributions), as shown in Figure 1.
EU8 (1)U8 (1−) U8 (1+)
V8 (E)
1
Figure 1: A monotone bidding strategy V8 (·) can be succinctly represented by its jump points, U8 (1) for
1 ∈ .
Irrational Equilibria. As discussed in our introduction, for our PPAD-completeness result, we will
be looking for an Y-approximate equilibrium, rather than an exact one. Of course, this only makes our
hardness results even stronger; but besides that, it is actually very much necessary for our membership
result in PPAD as well. In particular, as demonstrated by the example below, the FPA can have only
irrational equilibria, even when all input parameters are rational numbers.
Example 1. Consider a FPA with = = 3 bidders and common priors, whose values are independently
and identically distributed according to the uniform distribution on [0, 1]; that is, 8 (G) = G for 8 = 1, 2, 3.
Let the bidding space be  = {0, 1/2}. Clearly, this auction can be represented with piecewise-constant
density functions (with a single piece) and with a nite number of rational quantities. It can be veried






therefore, the unique equilibrium is irrational. We provide the detailed derivation in Appendix C.
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e appropriate seing for studying the computation of exact equilibria is the class FIXP of Etessami
and Yannakakis [2010]. In Sections 4.2 and 5 we show that the problem of exact equilibrium computation
of the FPA is FIXP-complete.
Further Notation. We conclude the section with the following terminology which will be useful
in multiple sections of our paper. For C1 < C2, we will let T[C1,C2 ] denote the truncation of a value G to
[C1, C2], i.e., T[C1,C2 ] (G) = max{C1,min{C2, G}}. Furthermore, for : ∈ ℕ we sometimes use [:] to denote
{1, 2, . . . , :}.
2.1 Outline
In Section 3 we provide a useful characterization of BNE and then show how to compute the best
responses in polynomial time. In Section 4, rst we provide a new existence proof via Brouwer’s xed
point theorem, and then proceed to prove the membership of the equilibrium computation problems
in PPAD and FIXP. In Section 5 we show the computational hardness for these classes. In Section 6
we present an ecient algorithm for a natural special case. We conclude with some interesting future
directions in Section 7.
3 Equilibrium Characterization and Best Response Computation
In this section we begin by presenting a useful characterization of Y-BNE that is crucial for many parts
of the paper. en, we show how best-responses of bidders can be checked and computed in polynomial
time. We remark that the reductions that we will construct in Section 4 to show the PPAD-membership
and the FIXP-membership of the problem do not technically require the computation of the whole
best-response function, but rather only the probabilities of winning the item given the bidder’s bid and
the bidding strategies of the other bidders. However, the best-response computation is interesting in its
own right, and that is why we present this here.
Characterization. e following lemma essentially states that an Y-BNE is characterized by the
behavior of the bidding function at the jump points. Recall that for any bid 1, we let 1− denote the
previous bid, and we use the conventions U8 (1−) = 0 when 1 = 0, and U8 (1) = 1 when 1 = max.
Lemma 3.1 (Characterization of Y-BNE). Fix an Y ≥ 0. A strategy prole # is an Y-BNE of the FPA, if
and only if, for every bidder 8 and every bid 1 with U8 (1−) < U8 (1),
D8 (1, #−8 ;U8 (1−)) ≥ D8 (1 ′, #−8 ;U8 (1−)) − Y for all 1 ′ < 1 (3)
and
D8 (1, #−8 ;U8 (1)) ≥ D8 (1 ′, #−8 ;U8 (1)) − Y for all 1 ′ > 1. (4)
e N -functions. Before proving this characterization, we introduce some useful notation. We use
the term 8 (1, #−8) to denote the (perceived) probability that bidder 8 wins the item with bid 1, when
the other bidders use bids according to the bidding strategy #−8 , i.e.,
8 (1, #−8) = Pr [bidder 8 wins|1, #−8]
e utility can easily be expressed in terms of this function, namely D8 (1, #−8 ; E8) = (E8 − 1) · 8 (1, #−8).
Proof of Lemma 3.1. (⇒): Fix a bidder 8 and a bid 1 with U8 (1−) < U8 (1). Since bidder 8 bids 1 inside the
non-empty interval (U8 (1−), U8 (1)], and # is an Y-BNE, we get that D8 (1, #−8 ; E8) ≥ D8 (1 ′, #−8 ; E8) − Y for
every E8 ∈ (U8 (1−), U8 (1)] and 1 ′ ≠ 1. Since the utilities are continuous functions on E8 , the inequalities
must also hold at the interval endpoints.
(⇐): Suppose (3, 4) hold. Take any bidder 8 and any valuation E8 , and let (U8 (1−), U8 (1)] be the
interval containing E8 . Notice that the utilities D8 (1, #−8 ; E8), D8 (1 ′, #−8 ; E8) are linear functions on E8 , with
8
slopes given by 8 (1, #−8), 8 (1 ′, #−8) respectively. For 1 ′ < 1, we know that 8 (1 ′, #−8) ≤ 8 (1, #−8)
and D8 (1, #−8 ; E) ≥ D8 (1 ′, #−8 ; E) − Y holds at E = U8 (1−); therefore it must hold also at E = E8 . Similarly
for 1 ′ > 1, we know that 8 (1 ′, #−8) ≥ 8 (1, #−8) and D8 (1, #−8 ; E) ≥ D8 (1 ′, #−8 ; E) − Y holds at E = U8 (1);
therefore it must hold also at E = E8 . We thus conclude that # is an Y-BNE. 
We now consider the basic computational problems of checking and computing best-responses of
bidders. We assume throughout that bidding strategies provided in the input are given via rational
quantities corresponding to the jump points U 9 (1), as dened in Section 2. e rst step to be able to
check or compute best-responses is the ecient computation of the  -functions dened above.
Computation of the N -functions. Recall that8 (1, #−8) = Pr [bidder 8 wins|1, #−8]. is probability
clearly depends on bidder 8’s prior on the other bidders’ distributions, as well as on whether 1 is the
highest bid, and if it is, how many other highest bids there are in the auction, in case of a tie. While the
form of the functions 8 can be be devised analytically, the expression involves exponentially many
terms in the number of bidders =; therefore it is not obvious that it can be computed eciently. e
following lemma states that this is in fact possible.
Lemma 3.2. Given a bidder 8 , a bid 1 and bidding strategies #−8 of the other bidders, the probability
8 (1, #−8) of bidder 8 winning the item can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. For ease of notation, we present the proof for bidder 8 = =. e cases for the other bidders are
analogous and can be handled, e.g., via an appropriate relabeling. e probability that bidder = wins
(given her bid and the bidding strategies of the other bidders) can be wrien as




: + 1) (1, = − 1, :), (5)
where, for 0 ≤ : ≤ ℓ ≤ = − 1, we use ) (1, ℓ, :) to denote the probability that exactly : out of the rst ℓ
bidders bid exactly 1, and the remaining ℓ − : bidders all bid below 1; in other words, for the special
case where ℓ = = − 1 in the above expression, ) (1, = − 1, :) is the probability of the highest bid being 1,
with : + 1 bidders (including bidder =) being tied for the highest bid. Next, for a given bidder 9 , let
 9,1− = =,9 (U 9 (1−)) = Pr
[
V 9 (E 9 ) < 1
]
, 6 9,1 = =,9 (U 9 (1)) − 91− = Pr
[
V 9 (E 9 ) = 1
]
denote the (perceived from the perspective of bidder =) probabilities that bidder 9 bids below 1, and
exactly 1, respectively. Note that  9,1− and 6 9,1 can be eciently computed with access to =,9 and "−= .
Moreover, one could write









 9,1− . (6)
Notice that (6) does not yield an ecient way of computing the probabilities, as the number of
summands can be exponential in =. To bypass this obstacle, we observe that, more generally, the
probabilities ) (1, ℓ, :) can be computed from ℓ,1− and 6ℓ,1 via dynamic programming, by conditioning
on bidder ℓ’s bid, in the following way:
) (1, 0, 0) = 1;
) (1, ℓ, :) = 0, for : > ℓ ;
) (1, ℓ + 1, 0) = ) (1, ℓ, 0)ℓ+1,1− ;
) (1, ℓ + 1, : + 1) = ) (1, ℓ, :)6ℓ+1,1 +) (1, ℓ, : + 1)ℓ+1,1− ; for : ≤ ℓ .
us, all values of ) (1, = − 1, :), for : = 0, . . . , = − 1, can be computed with a total number of $ (=2)
recursive calls, so that = (1, #−=) can be computed in polynomial time. 
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Lemma 3.2 implies that the utilities in (3, 4) of the characterization (Lemma 3.1) can be computed in
polynomial time. Since there are$ (= | |2) inequalities to check in Lemma 3.1, we immediately conclude
the following.
Corollary 3.3. Given Y ≥ 0, and a strategy prole # in a rst-price auction with subjective priors, one
can determine in polynomial time if # constitutes an Y-BNE.
Using Lemma 3.2, we can now also eciently compute best-responses, and, in fact, even exact
best-responses (i.e., Y-best-responses for Y = 0).
eorem 3.4. In a rst-price auction with subjective priors, the bidders’ best-responses can be computed
in polynomial time.
Proof. Given a bidder 8 and the vector of bidding strategies #−8 , one can compute in polynomial time
the probabilities 8 (1, #−8) for each bid 1 ∈  using Lemma 3.2. Now recall that the utility of bidder
8 , when having a valuation of E8 and bidding 1, is given by D8 (1, #−8 ; E8) = (E8 − 1) · 8 (1, #−8), which
is a linear function on E8 having slope 8 (1, #−8). us, maximizing the utility amounts to taking the
maximum (or upper envelope) of | | linear functions; the result is a piecewise linear function whose
jump points can be eciently computed by solving linear equations. In particular, given bids 1 < 1 ′, we
can compute U = Ũ8 (1, 1 ′) as the solution of D8 (1, #−8 ;U) = D8 (1 ′, #−8 ;U), that is,
Ũ8 (1,1 ′) =
{
1′8 (1′,#−8 )−18 (1,#−8 )
8 (1′,#−8 )−8 (1,#−8 ) if 8 (1
′, #−8) ≠ 8 (1, #−8),
+∞ otherwise.
Intuitively, Ũ8 (1,1 ′) is the jump point corresponding to bidding 1 versus bidding 1 ′: bidder 8 achieves
higher utility by bidding 1 i E8 < Ũ8 (1,1 ′). Now the highest value for which bidder 8 (weakly) prefers
bidding 1 versus any other higher bid is min1′>1 Ũ8 (1,1 ′); if at this valuation, bidding 1 also achieves
higher utility than bidding any other lower bid, then min1′>1 Ũ8 (1,1 ′) is indeed one of the desired jump
points. Otherwise, 1 is a degenerate bid, in the sense that there is no valuation for which 1 is an optimal
response. erefore, the jump points introduced in (2) are given by U8 (1) = max1′≤1 min1′′>1′ Ũ8 (1 ′, 1 ′′).5
Clearly then, the U8 (1) can be found in polynomial time. 
4 Existence and Membership in PPAD and FIXP
e existence of equilibria in our seing can essentially be established by adapting a proof by Athey
[2001], which relies on Kakutani’s xed point theorem. Unfortunately, proofs that are based on this
xed point theorem cannot easily be turned into membership results for computational classes such as
PPAD and FIXP. is is especially true for FIXP which is essentially dened as the class of all problems
that can be solved by nding a Brouwer xed point. In order to circumvent this obstacle we present a
new proof that uses Brouwer’s xed point theorem. In this section, we rst present this proof, and then
utilize it to prove membership of our problems of interest in PPAD and FIXP.
4.1 Existence of Equilibria via Brouwer’s Fixed Point eorem
eorem 4.1. Every rst-price auction with continuous subjective priors and nite bidding space admits
a monotone non-decreasing and non-overbidding pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let # = {1, 2, . . . , =} be the set of bidders, 8, 9 the continuous subjective priors, and 0 =
10, 11, . . . , 1< be the ordered list of bids, i.e., the elements of  ⊆ [0, 1]. Recall that a monotone
non-decreasing strategy V8 : [0, 1] →  can be represented by its jump points U8 (1). Let
D = {" = (U1, U2, . . . , U=) ∈ ([0, 1]<)= | ∀8 ∈ #, 9 ∈ [<] : U8 (1 9−2) ≤ U8 (1 9−1) ∧ 1 9 ≤ U8 (1 9−1)}
5
e maximization over1 ′ ≤ 1 serves to exclude degenerate cases, e.g. if1 ′ < 1 < 1 ′′ but Ũ8 (1,1 ′′) < Ũ8 (1 ′, 1 ′′) < Ũ8 (1, 1 ′).
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where we use the convention U8 (1−1) := 0 to keep the notation simple. e domain D is the set of all
monotone non-decreasing non-overbidding strategy proles, represented by their jump points. Note
that D is compact and convex.
In what follows we slightly abuse notation by replacing the strategy prole # by its representation
" in some terms. Recall the functions 8 (1,"−8) dened in Section 3, which represent the probability
that bidder 8 wins the auction, if they bid 1. By inspecting the proof of Lemma 3.2, it is easy to see that
the quantities  91− and 6 91 are continuous with respect to "−8 , since the distributions are continuous.
As a result, the terms ) (1, = − 1, 9) are also continuous in "−8 (by (6)), which implies that 8 (1, #−8) is
also continuous in "−8 . Since the utility functions can be wrien as D8 (1,"−8 ; E8) = (E8 − 1) · 8 (1,"−8),
it follows that the functions ("−8 , E8) ↦→ D8 (1,"−8 ; E8) are continuous.
We now construct a function  : D → D. For any bidder 8 ∈ # and any 9 ∈ [<], dene the
continuous function Δ89 : D → ℝ by
Δ89 (" ) = D8 (1 9−1,"−8 ;U8 (1 9−1)) −max
ℓ≥ 9
D8 (1ℓ ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9−1)).
Now, for any " ∈ D, let  (" ) = " ′, where for all 8 ∈ # and 9 = 1, 2, . . . ,< (consecutively and in that
order)
U ′8 (1 9−1) = T[max{1 9 ,U′8 (1 9−2) },1] (U8 (1 9−1) + Δ
8
9 (" )) . (7)
Note in particular that this is well-dened, since U ′8 (1 9−2) is dened before U ′8 (1 9−1). e truncation
operator immediately ensures that " ′ ∈ D. Since is also clearly continuous, and D is compact and
convex, it follows by Brouwer’s xed point theorem that there exists a " ∈ D with  (" ) = " . It
remains to prove that " corresponds to an equilibrium of the auction.
Consider some bidder 8 ∈ # . We will show thatU8 is a best-response to"−8 using the characterization
of Lemma 3.1. Consider any non-empty interval of non-empty interior [U8 (1 9−1), U8 (1 9 )], for some
9 ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,<}, where we use the convention that U8 (1−1) = 0 and U8 (1<) = 1.
• First, we show that D8 (1 9 ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9 )) ≥ maxℓ> 9 D8 (1ℓ ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9 )). Clearly, for 9 =< this holds
trivially. For 9 < <, this can immediately be rephrased as showing Δ89+1(" ) ≥ 0. Now, note that
by assumption we have U8 (1 9 ) > U8 (1 9−1). us, since U8 (1 9 ) remains xed under  , it must be
that U8 (1 9 ) = 1 9+1 or Δ89+1(" ) ≥ 0. However, if U8 (1 9 ) = 1 9+1, then it also trivially holds that
Δ89+1(" ) ≥ 0.
• Next, we show that D8 (1 9 ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9−1)) ≥ maxℓ< 9 D8 (1ℓ ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9−1)). Again, this holds trivially
for 9 = 0, so we now consider 9 > 0. By the rst bullet above, it holds that
D8 (1 9 ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9 )) = max
ℓ≥ 9
D8 (1ℓ ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9 )) .
As a result, by the monotonicity of the  -functions (see the proof of Lemma 3.1), this continues
to hold if we replace U8 (1 9 ) by U8 (1 9−1), i.e.,
D8 (1 9 ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9−1)) = max
ℓ≥ 9
D8 (1ℓ ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9−1)) .
On the other hand, since U8 (1 9−1) < U8 (1 9 ), it follows in particular that U8 (1: ) < 1 for all : < 9 .
As a result, since U8 (1: ) remains xed under  , it must be that Δ8:+1(" ) ≤ 0 for all : < 9 , i.e.,
D8 (1: ,"−8 ;U8 (1: )) ≤ max
ℓ≥:+1
D8 (1ℓ ,"−8 ;U8 (1: ))
which by monotonicity of the  -functions (see the proof of Lemma 3.1), continues to hold if we
replace U8 (1: ) by U8 (1 9−1), i.e., for all : < 9 we have
D8 (1: ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9−1)) ≤ max
ℓ≥:+1
D8 (1ℓ ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9−1)) .
As a result it follows by induction that for all : < 9
D8 (1: ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9−1)) ≤ max
ℓ≥ 9
D8 (1ℓ ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9−1)) = D8 (1 9 ,"−8 ;U8 (1 9−1)) .
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By Lemma 3.1, it immediately follows that U8 is a best-response to "−8 . Since this holds for all bidders
8 ∈ # , " is an equilibrium. 
4.2 FIXP Membership
In order to study the exact equilibrium problem for the rst-price auction in the context of FIXP, we
consider the model where the distributions 8, 9 are given by algebraic circuits using the operations
{+,−,×, /,max,min, :√·} and rational constants, as is usual in this seing [Etessami and Yannakakis,
2010]. We show that the proof of existence in the previous section can be turned into a reduction.
eorem 4.2. e problem exact-BNE-FPA lies in FIXP.
Proof. Clearly, the domain D of the function  : D → D from the proof of eorem 4.1 can be
represented by a set of linear inequalities that can be constructed in polynomial time in =,< and the
representation length of . us, it remains to show that we can construct in polynomial time an
algebraic circuit that computes  .
We now describe how to construct a circuit for that only uses operations {+, −, ×, /, max, min, :√·}
and rational constants. First of all, note that probabilities of the form PrE9∼8,9 [V 9 (E 9 ) ≤ 1] = 8, 9 (U 9 (1))
can easily be computed by the circuit, since the (cumulative) distribution functions 8, 9 are provided as
algebraic circuits, and " is the input to the circuit. It follows that the quantities  91− and 6 91 dened
in the proof of Lemma 3.2 can also be computed by the circuit. As a result, we can use the dynamic
programming procedure described in the proof of Lemma 3.2, to compute the terms) (1, =−1, 9) by only
using a polynomial number of operations. Note in particular, that the dynamic programming assignment
rules can all be implemented using the available set of operations. With the terms) (1, = − 1, 9) in hand,
we can then easily compute the terms 8 (1,"−8) for all 1 ∈ , and thus evaluate the utility function
D8 (1,"−8 ; E8) = (E8 − 1) · 8 (1,"−8) at any given E8 ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, using the utility functions and the
max operation we can now compute the terms Δ89 (" ) from the proof of eorem 4.1, and then using +,
max, min and the constant 1 we can output " ′ =  (" ) by noting that
U ′8 (1 9−1) = max{max{1 9 , U ′8 (1 9−2)},min{1, U8 (1 9−1) + 689 (" )}}. 
4.3 PPAD Membership
In order to study the approximate equilibrium problem for the rst-price auction in the context of PPAD,
we consider a model where the distributions 8, 9 are polynomially-computable, i.e., can be evaluated in
polynomial time by a Turing machine.
6
In order to guarantee that an approximate equilibrium with
polynomial bit complexity exists, we also assume that the distributions are polynomially continuous.
For a formal denition of these two standard properties in the context of PPAD, see Appendix A. In
this section we show that in this model, the problem of computing an Y-BNE lies in the class PPAD. We
begin by observing that the polynomial-continuity of the distribution functions 8, 9 implies that the
utility functions are also polynomially-continuous. is is proved in Appendix D.
Lemma 4.3. If the distributions 8, 9 are polynomially-continuous, then so are the utility functions " ↦→
D8 (1,"−8 ; E8). In more detail, given Y > 0, we can in polynomial time compute X > 0 such that for all 8 ∈ # ,
1 ∈  and E8 ∈ [0, 1]
‖" − " ′‖∞ ≤ X =⇒ |D8 (1,"−8 ; E8) − D8 (1," ′−8 ; E8) | ≤ Y.
In particular, X can be represented using a polynomial number of bits.
6
Note that a function represented as an algebraic circuit (as in the previous section on FIXP) is not necessarily polynomially-
computable, e.g., because the circuit can use “repeated squaring” to construct numbers with exponential bit complexity.
Conversely, a function that is polynomially-computable cannot necessarily be represented as an algebraic circuit, because a
Turing machine is not restricted to using arithmetic gates. We note that these two dierent models for representing functions
are standard for FIXP and PPAD respectively.
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We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
eorem 4.4. e problem Y-BNE-FPA lies in PPAD.
Proof. We show that the existence proof of eorem 4.1 can be turned into a polynomial-time many-
one reduction to the problem of computing an approximate Brouwer xed point of a polynomially-
computable and polynomially-continuous function over a bounded polytope given by linear inequalities,
known to lie in PPAD [Etessami and Yannakakis, 2010, Proposition 2].
Since the distributions 8, 9 are polynomially-computable, and by the arguments provided in the
proof of eorem 4.2 (including the dynamic programming procedure from Lemma 3.2), it immediately
follows that  is polynomially-computable. e polynomial-continuity of  also immediately follows
from the polynomial-continuity of the utility functions (Lemma 4.3). us, the problem of computing
an approximate xed point of  lies in PPAD.
Given Y > 0, by Lemma 4.3 we can compute X > 0 so that for all 8 ∈ # , 1 ∈  and E8 ∈ [0, 1]




Now consider any X-approximate xed point of  , i.e., " ∈ D such that ‖ (" ) − " ‖∞ ≤ X . Let
" ′ =  (" ). We prove that " ′ is an Y-approximate equilibrium of the rst-price auction. is shows
that Y-BNE-FPA reduces to the Brouwer xed point computation problem, and thus lies in PPAD.
Since " ′ =  (" ) and ‖ (" ) − " ‖∞ ≤ X , it holds that ‖" − " ′‖∞ ≤ X and thus




for all 8 ∈ # , 1 ∈  and E8 ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, we also have that |Δ89 (" ) − Δ89 (" ′) | ≤ 2(Y/16< + X) ≤
Y/4< (since the utility functions are also 1-Lipschitz with respect to E8 ). Note that here we assumed
without loss of generality that X ≤ Y/16<.
Fix some bidder 8 ∈ # . Consider any non-empty interval [U ′8 (1 9−1), U ′8 (1 9 )] for some 9 ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,<},
where we use the convention that U ′8 (1−1) = 0 and U ′8 (1<) = 1.
• First, we show that D8 (1 9 ," ′−8 ;U ′8 (1 9 )) ≥ maxℓ> 9 D8 (1ℓ ," ′−8 ;U ′8 (1 9 )) − Y/2. Clearly, for 9 =< this
holds trivially. For 9 < <, this can immediately be rephrased as showing Δ89+1(" ′) ≥ −Y/2. By (8),
it suces to show that Δ89+1(" ) ≥ −Y/2 + Y/4<. But if Δ89+1(" ) < −Y/2 + Y/4< ≤ −Y/16< ≤ −X ,
then by construction of  , since |U8 (1 9 ) − U ′8 (1 9 ) | ≤ X , it must be that U ′8 (1 9 ) = 1 9−1 or U ′8 (1 9 ) =
U ′8 (1 9−1). In the former case, it trivially holds that Δ89+1(" ′) ≥ 0 ≥ −Y. e laer case is impossible,
since we assumed that U ′8 (1 9−1) < U ′8 (1 9 ).
• Next, we show that D8 (1 9 ," ′−8 ;U ′8 (1 9−1)) ≥ maxℓ< 9 D8 (1ℓ ," ′−8 ;U ′8 (1 9−1)) − Y. Again, this holds
trivially for 9 = 0, so we now consider 9 > 0. By the rst bullet above, it holds that
D8 (1 9 ," ′−8 ;U ′8 (1 9 )) ≥ max
ℓ≥ 9
D8 (1ℓ ," ′−8 ;U ′8 (1 9 )) − Y/2.
As a result, by the monotonicity of the  -functions (see the proof of Lemma 3.1), this continues
to hold if we replace U ′8 (1 9 ) by U ′8 (1 9−1), i.e.,
D8 (1 9 ," ′−8 ;U ′8 (1 9−1)) ≥ max
ℓ≥ 9
D8 (1ℓ ," ′−8 ;U ′8 (1 9−1)) − Y/2. (9)
On the other hand, since U ′8 (1 9−1) < U ′8 (1 9 ), it follows in particular that U ′8 (1: ) < 1 for all : < 9 .
As a result, by construction of  , and since |U8 (1: ) − U ′8 (1: ) | ≤ X , it must be that Δ8:+1(" ) ≤ X
for all : < 9 . By (8) it follows that Δ8
:+1("
′) ≤ X + Y/4< ≤ Y/2< for all : < 9 , which yields
D8 (1: ," ′−8 ;U ′8 (1: )) ≤ max
ℓ≥:+1




which by monotonicity of the  -functions (see the proof of Lemma 3.1), continues to hold if we
replace U ′8 (1: ) by U ′8 (1 9−1), i.e., for all : < 9 we have
D8 (1: ," ′−8 ;U ′8 (1 9−1)) ≤ max
ℓ≥:+1




As a result it follows by induction that for all : < 9
D8 (1: ," ′−8 ;U ′8 (1 9−1)) ≤ max
ℓ≥ 9
D8 (1ℓ ," ′−8 ;U ′8 (1 9−1)) + ( 9 − :)
Y
2<
which together with (9) yields that for all : < 9






By Lemma 3.1, it immediately follows that U ′8 is a Y-best-response to "
′
−8 . Since this holds for all bidders
8 ∈ # , " ′ is an Y-equilibrium. 
5 Computational Hardness
In this section we prove computational hardness results for the problem of computing an equilibrium of
a rst-price auction with subjective priors. Namely, we show that computing an Y-BNE is PPAD-hard,
while computing an exact BNE is FIXP-hard. Our computational hardness results are particularly robust,
because they hold even if we apply all of the following restrictions:
• the bidding space is  = {0, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5},
• the value distributions 8, 9 are given by very simple piecewise constant density functions,
• Y is some suciently small constant. (only relevant for Y-BNE)
In particular, by a simple rescaling argument, the hardness results also hold when the bidding space
consists of all monetary amounts that are increments of some xed denomination (e.g., one cent) up to
some number<.7 For example, there exists a suciently small constant Y such that it is PPAD-hard
to compute an Y-BNE when the bidding space is  = {0, 1/100, 2/100, . . . , 99/100, 1, 101/100, . . . ,< −
1/100,<}.
Together with the corresponding membership results proved in the previous section (eorems 4.2
and 4.4), we thus obtain the following two theorems, which are the main results of this paper.
eorem 5.1. ere exists a constant Y > 0 such that the problem Y-BNE-FPA is PPAD-complete.
eorem 5.2. e problem exact-BNE-FPA is FIXP-complete.
In the rest of this section, we present the proof of our hardness results. A nice feature of our proof
is that we provide a single reduction to prove both PPAD- and FIXP-hardness. In more detail, we reduce
from the so-called Generalized Circuit problem, which has been instrumental for proving PPAD-hardness
results for Nash equilibrium computation problems [Daskalakis et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009; Rubinstein,
2018]. In fact, we show that it suces to consider signicantly restricted versions of the Generalized
Circuit problem when proving hardness results, and that an exact version of the problem can also
be used to prove FIXP-hardness. Since we believe that these points may be of independent interest
for future works, they are presented separately in Section 5.1. Our reduction from this problem to
equilibrium computation in rst-price auctions is then presented in Section 5.2.
7
Note that< should be provided in the input in unary representation. is is necessary to ensure that the bidding space
has polynomial size, thus allowing ecient computation of best-responses. See the discussion in Section 2 regarding our
assumption of an explicit bidding space.
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5.1 e Generalized Circuit Problem
Generalized circuits, dened by Chen et al. [2009], can be viewed as a generalization of arithmetic
circuits where we also allow cycles. is means that instead of representing a function, a generalized
circuit represents a certain kind of constraint satisfaction problem. Indeed, the goal in the Generalized
Circuit problem is to assign a value to each gate of the circuit such that all the gates are (approximately)
satised. Importantly, gates are only allowed to take values in [0, 1] and arithmetic operations are
truncated accordingly. As a result, it can be shown that by Brouwer’s xed point theorem, there always
exists an assignment of values that satises all the gates. However, computing even an approximate
assignment is already PPAD-hard, i.e., essentially as hard as any Brouwer xed point computation. We
now provide some formal denitions.
Denition 2. A generalized circuit8 with gate-types G is a list of gates 61, 62, . . . , 6m. Every gate 68 is a
3-tuple 68 = (, 9, :), where ∈ G is the type of the gate, and 9, : ∈ [m] = {1, . . . ,m} are the indices
of the input gates 6 9 , 6: (8, 9, : distinct).
Before describing possible types of gates, we introduce some notation. Let T = T[0,1] . Furthermore, we
use the notation G = ~ ± Y to denote that |G − ~ | ≤ Y.
Consider a generalized circuit 61, 62, . . . , 6m and an assignment v : [m] → [0, 1] of values to its
gates. We say that a gate is Y-satised by the assignment, if the constraint imposed by this gate is
satised with error at most Y. e constraint that a gate 68 = (, 9, :) must satisfy depends on its
gate-type  ∈ G, e.g.,
• if  = 1, then v[68] = 1 ± Y (constant 1)
• if  = +, then v[68] = T(v[6 9 ] + v[6: ]) ± Y (addition)
• if  = −, then v[68] = T(v[6 9 ] − v[6: ]) ± Y (subtraction)
• if  = 1−, then v[68] = 1 − v[6 9 ] ± Y (complement)
• if  = ×2, then v[68] = T(2 · v[6 9 ]) ± Y (multiplication by 2)
• if  = ×, then v[68] = v[6 9 ] · v[6: ] ± Y (multiplication)
• if  =  ( ·)2 , then v[68] = (v[6 9 ])2 ± Y (square)
We are now ready to dene the associated computational problem.
Denition 3. Let Y > 0. e problem Y-Gcircuit with gate-types G is dened as follows: given a
generalized circuit 61, 62, . . . , 6m with gate-types G, nd an assignment v : [m] → [0, 1] to the gates
such that they are all Y-satised.
Rubinstein [2018] proved that this problem is PPAD-complete for some suciently small constant Y > 0
and a relatively large set of gate-types G. In Appendix E.1, we prove that the problem remains hard,
even with a very restricted set of gate-types.
Proposition 5.3. ere exists a constant Y > 0 such that the problem Y-Gcircuit with gate-types
G = {+,1−} is PPAD-complete. is continues to hold if we instead take G = {1,−}.
We can also dene a problem exact-Gcircuit, where the goal is to nd an assignment that exactly
satises all constraints (i.e., with Y = 0). In Appendix E.2, we prove the following result.
Proposition 5.4. e problem exact-Gcircuit with gate-types G = {1−,+, ( ·)2} is FIXP-complete.
is continues to hold if we instead take G = {1−,×2,×}.
8
Note that in the usual denition of generalized circuits, every gate also contains a rational parameter Z ∈ [0, 1], which is
used by some gate-types, e.g., a gate performing multiplication by the constant Z . In our denition, gates do not contain this
rational parameter, because, as we show in Propositions 5.3 and 5.4, these gate-types are actually not needed for the problems
to be hard.
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5.2 Reduction to BNE-FPA
In this section, we present a reduction that achieves the following: given a generalized circuit, it
constructs (in polynomial time) an instance of the rst-price auction problem, such that for all Y ∈
[0, 1/105], from any Y-BNE we can extract an 500Y-satisfying assignment for the generalized circuit.
Furthermore, this “extraction” of the assignment from an Y-BNE can be done eciently and, in fact,
using a simple so-called separable linear transformation. is ensures that in the case Y = 0, we
obtain a so-called SL-reduction from exact-Gcircuit, which yields the FIXP-hardness result [Etessami
and Yannakakis, 2010]. If we let Ỹ > 0 be a constant such that Ỹ-Gcircuit is PPAD-hard, then for
Y = min{1/105, Ỹ/500} the reduction is a valid polynomial-time many-one reduction, which yields the
PPAD-hardness result.
An obstacle to obtaining the desired reduction is that it is unclear how to simulate a +-gate or
a ×-gate. As a result, we reduce from the Gcircuit problem with gate-types G = {×2,1−,q },
where q : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1], (G,~) ↦→ 1
4
(G + 1) (~ + 1). is means that a gate 68 = (q , 9, :) enforces the
constraint v[68] = q (v[6 9 ], v[6: ]) ± Y. In Appendix E.3 we prove that this set of gate-types is sucient
for our desired hardness results.
Lemma 5.5. Let G = {×2,1−,q }. ere exists a constant Ỹ > 0 such that the problem Ỹ-Gcircuit
with gate-types G is PPAD-complete. Furthermore, exact-Gcircuit with gate-types G is FIXP-complete.
e reduction. We begin with a high-level description of the reduction. Consider a generalized circuit
61, 62, . . . , 6m with gate-types G = {×2,1−,q }. We construct a rst-price auction with bidding space
 = {0, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5} and a set of bidders # = {1, 2, . . . , =} where = = 10m. For every 8 ∈ [m],
bidder 8 will “correspond” to gate 68 , in the sense that, in any Y-BNE # , the position of the second jump
point of V8 , i.e., U8 (1/5) will encode the value v[68] that we will assign to gate 68 . us, we will refer
to the bidders 1, 2, . . . ,m as gate-bidders. e rest of the bidders will be used as intermediate steps
to enforce the desired constraints on the strategies of the gate-bidders. Accordingly, we will refer to
them as auxiliary-bidders. Note that for every gate-bidder, there are 9 auxiliary-bidders available (if
needed). For convenience, we describe the construction with the value space [0, 5] instead of [0, 1]. is
is without consequence, since this re-scaling of the instance simply means that we have to replace Y by
5Y at the end. Note that as a result of the re-scaling, the bidding space is now simply  = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
Valid strategies and encoded value. Let # be any Y-BNE of the auction. A bidder 8 ∈ # is said to be
valid, if U8 (0) ∈ [1, 1 + 1/2], U8 (1) ∈ [2 + 1/3 − 2Y, 2 + 2/3 + 2Y], U8 (2) ∈ [3 + 1/2, 5] and U8 (3) = 5. e
bidder 8 is almost-valid, if the condition on U8 (1) is relaxed to U8 (1) ∈ [2, 3]. For every bidder 8 ∈ # , we
dene the value encoded by bidder 8 according to # , as
v# [8] =
{
T[0,1] (3(U8 (1) − 2 − 1/3)) if 8 is valid,
null otherwise.
Note that we always have v# [8] ∈ [0, 1] ∪ {null}. In the rest of the proof, we drop the subscript # , since
it is understood from the context. Our construction will ensure that for all 8 ∈ [m], bidder 8 is valid and
as a result v[8] ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, leing v[68] := v[8] will yield an 100Y-satisfying assignment of
the generalized circuit.
Gadgets. e rest of the proof describes the construction of the distribution functions 8, 9 . We begin
by constructing some unary gadgets. A unary gadget has a single “input” bidder 9 ∈ # and an output
bidder 8 ∈ # \ { 9}. e goal of such a gadget is to establish a constraint on V8 that depends on V 9 ,
but not on the strategy of any other bidder. is is achieved by seing 8,: for all : ∈ # \ {8, 9}, such
that its (piecewise constant) density function has a single piece of volume 1 lying in [0, 1]. As a result,
because of the no-overbidding assumption, bidder 8 will believe that all bidders : ∈ # \ {8, 9} bid 0 with
probability 1. e behavior of the gadget is then determined by the precise construction of 8, 9 .
Base Gadget. e base gadget with input bidder 9 and output bidder 8 has four parameters Wℓ , WA , ℓ, A ∈
[0, 1] with Wℓ +WA < 1 and A − ℓ > 0. e piecewise constant density function of 8, 9 is dened as follows.
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Figure 2: An illustration of the base gadget. e density of 8, 9 is depicted. When Wℓ = WA = 1/3, ℓ = 1/3
and A = 2/3 we obtain a standard base gadget, which essentially (approximately) “copies” the value v[8]
of the input bidder 8 to the value v[ 9] of the output bidder 9 .
ere is a piece of volume Wℓ in the interval [1+ 1/2, 1+ 3/4], a piece of volume 1−Wℓ −WA in [2+ ℓ, 2+A ],
and nally a piece of volume WA in [3 + 1/4, 3 + 1/2]. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
When the parameters are (Wℓ , WA , ℓ, A ) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 2/3), we call this the standard base gadget. It
will immediately follow from Claim 1 below that if the input bidder 9 of the standard base gadget is
valid, then so is the output bidder 8 , and furthermore v[8] = v[ 9] ± 6Y. In other words, this gadget can
be used to copy the value encoded by one bidder onto some other bidder.
Claim 1. Let Wℓ , WA , ℓ, A ∈ [0, 1] with Wℓ , WA ≥ 1/20, Wℓ + WA < 1 and ℓ < A . Consider a base gadget with
input bidder 9 and output bidder 8 , and parameters (Wℓ , WA , ℓ, A ). It holds that:
• If the input bidder 9 is almost-valid, then the output bidder 8 is also almost-valid.
• If Wℓ , WA ≥ 1/3 and 9 is almost-valid, then 8 is valid and
v[8] = (3Wℓ − 1) + 3(1 − Wℓ − WA )
)[2+ℓ,2+A ] (U 9 (1)) − (2 + ℓ)
A − ℓ ± 6Y.
Proof. We begin by obtaining some equations that will be useful for various proofs in this section.
Consider any unary gadget with input bidder 9 and output bidder 8 . To simplify notation, for 1 ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, let ?1 be the probability that bidder 9 bids 1, as perceived by bidder 8 . Formally,
?1 := Pr
E9∼8,9
[V 9 (E 9 ) = 1] =
{
8, 9 (U 9 (1)) − 8, 9 (U 9 (1 − 1)) if 1 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
8, 9 (U 9 (0)) if 1 = 0.
Recall the quantity 8 (1, #−8) dened in Section 3, which represents the probability that bidder 8 wins
the auction if she bids 1, and the other bidders act according to #−8 . We drop #−8 from the notation,
since it is clear from the context. Going back to our unary gadget, it is easy to see that 8 (0) = ?0/=,
8 (1) = ?0+?1/2,8 (2) = ?0+?1+?2/2,8 (3) = ?0+?1+?2+?3/2 and8 (4) = ?0+?1+?2+?3+?4/2. By
Lemma 3.1 the rst jump point U8 (0) of V8 must necessarily satisfyD8 (0, #−8 ;U8 (0)) ≥ D8 (1, #−8 ;U8 (0)) −Y
(because the interval (0, U8 (0)) is non-empty by the non-overbidding assumption). We can rewrite this
as 8 (0) · (U8 (0) − 0) ≥ 8 (1) · (U8 (0) − 1) − Y, which yields
U8 (0) ≤
8 (1) + Y
8 (1) − 8 (0)
= 1 + 8 (0) + Y
8 (1) − 8 (0)
= 1 + ?0/= + Y
?0(= − 1)/= + ?1/2
(10)
where the fraction is interpreted as +∞ when ?0 + ?1 = 0. Similarly, by Lemma 3.1, the fourth
jump point must satisfy D8 (4, #−8 ;U8 (3)) ≥ D8 (3, #−8 ;U8 (3)) − Y, unless U8 (3) = 5. Rewriting this as
8 (4) · (U8 (3) − 4) ≥ 8 (3) · (U8 (3) − 3) − Y, we obtain that U8 (3) = 5 or
U8 (3) ≥
48 (4) − 38 (3) − Y
8 (4) − 8 (3)
= 4 + 8 (3) − Y
8 (4) − 8 (3)
= 4 + ?0 + ?1 + ?2 + ?3/2 − Y
?3/2 + ?4/2
. (11)
Again, by Lemma 3.1, the third jump point must satisfy D8 (3, #−8 ;U8 (2)) ≥ D8 (2, #−8 ;U8 (2)) − Y, unless
U8 (2) = U8 (3), and it must satisfy D8 (2, #−8 ;U8 (2)) ≥ D8 (3, #−8 ;U8 (2)) − Y, unless U8 (2) = U8 (1). us it
follows that
U8 (2) = T[U8 (1),U8 (3) ]
(
38 (3) − 28 (2) ± Y
8 (3) − 8 (2)
)
= T[U8 (1),U8 (3) ]
(





Finally, by Lemma 3.1, the second jump point must satisfy D8 (2, #−8 ;U8 (1)) ≥ D8 (1, #−8 ;U8 (1)) − Y, unless
U8 (1) = U8 (2), and it must satisfy D8 (1, #−8 ;U8 (1)) ≥ D8 (2, #−8 ;U8 (1)) − Y, unless U8 (1) = U8 (0). As a
result, it must be that
U8 (1) = T[U8 (0),U8 (2) ]
(
28 (2) − 8 (1) ± Y
8 (2) − 8 (1)
)
= T[U8 (0),U8 (2) ]
(




We are now ready to prove Claim 1. Consider a base gadget with input bidder 9 , output bidder 8 and
parameters (Wℓ , WA , ℓ, A ), such that Wℓ , WA ≥ 1/20, Wℓ + WA < 1 and ℓ < A . Let ?1 denote the probability that
bidder 9 bids 1, as perceived by bidder 8 .
Assume rst that bidder 9 is almost-valid. en, by the construction of 8, 9 , we obtain that ?0 = ?3 =
?4 = 0, ?1 ∈ [Wℓ , 1 − WA ] and ?2 = 1 − ?1. Using (10) we have that U8 (0) ≤ 1 + Y?1/2 ≤ 1 +
2Y
Wℓ
≤ 1 + 1/2
since Wℓ ≥ 4Y. Using (11) we obtain that U8 (3) = 5, since ?3 = ?4 = 0 and 1 − Y > 0. (12) yields that
U8 (2) ≥ 3 + 1+?1−2Y
1−?1 ≥ 3 + 1/2, since Y ≤ 1/4. us, in order to show that bidder 8 is almost-valid, it
remains to prove that U8 (1) ∈ [2, 3]. Using (13) we can write
U8 (1) = T[U8 (0),U8 (2) ]
(
2 + 2?0 + ?1 ± 2Y
?1 + ?2
)
= T[U8 (0),U8 (2) ] (2 + ?1 ± 2Y) = 2 + ?1 ± 2Y
where we used the fact that ?1 + 2Y ≤ 1, since ?1 ≤ 1 − WA and WA ≥ 2Y. Note that this also yields that
U8 (1) ≤ 3, while the bound U8 (1) ≥ 2 holds because ?1 ≥ Wℓ and Wℓ ≥ 2Y (or simply because of the
no-overbidding assumption). As a result, bidder 8 is almost-valid.
Now consider the case where, in addition, Wℓ , WA ≥ 1/3. We can write
?1 = Wℓ + (1 − Wℓ − WA )
T[2+ℓ,2+A ] (U 9 (1)) − (2 + ℓ)
A − ℓ .
In particular, it holds that ?1 ∈ [1/3, 2/3]. Since, as shown above, U8 (1) = 2 + ?1 ± 2Y, we immediately
obtain that U8 (1) ∈ [2 + 1/3 − 2Y, 2 + 2/3 + 2Y], i.e., bidder 8 is valid. Furthermore, we can write
v[8] = T[0,1] (3(U8 (1) −2−1/3)) = 3?1−1±6Y = (3Wℓ −1) +3(1−Wℓ −WA )
T[2+ℓ,2+A ] (U 9 (1)) − (2 + ℓ)
A − ℓ ±6Y
which proves the claim. 
Projection Gadget. e projection gadget with input bidder 9 and output bidder 8 , uses two additional
auxiliary-bidders : and : ′, and consists of three uses of the standard base gadget. Concretely, the rst
standard base gadget has input 9 and output : , the second such gadget has input : and output : ′, and
the third has input : ′ and output 8 . See Figure 3a for an illustration. As stated in the claim below, the
projection gadget has the notable property that the output bidder 8 is always valid. is gadget will be
used to ultimately ensure that all the gate-bidders are valid.
Claim 2. e projection gadget with input bidder 9 and output bidder 8 ensures that:
• the output bidder 8 is valid, and
• if the input bidder 9 is valid, then v[8] = v[ 9] ± 18Y.
Proof. e second point follows immediately from Claim 1 applied to the standard base gate. us, it
remains to show that the output bidder 8 is always valid. Consider the rst standard base gadget, which
has input bidder 9 and output bidder : . Let ?1 denote the probability that bidder 9 bids 1, as perceived
by bidder : . Since the density function of :,9 has a block of volume 1/3 lying in [1 + 1/2, 1 + 3/4], and
since we do not allow overbidding, it follows that ?0 + ?1 ≥ 1/3. Using (10) this implies that
U: (0) ≤ 1 +
?0/= + Y
?0(= − 1)/= + ?1/2
≤ 1 + 6/= + 6Y ≤ 1 + 1/2
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since wlog = ≥ 24 and Y ≤ 1/24. Next, using (11) we immediately get that U: (3) ≥ 4 since Y < 1/3 (or
just by using the no-overbidding assumption). en, (12) implies that
U: (2) = T[U: (1),U: (3) ]
(
3 + 2?0 + 2?1 + ?2 ± 2Y
?2 + ?3
)
≥ 4 − 2Y ≥ 3 + 1/2
where we used ?0 + ?1 ≥ 1/3, ?2 + ?3 ≤ 2/3, and Y ≤ 1/4. Finally, note that U: (1) ≥ 2 by the
no-overbidding assumption.
Next, consider the second standard base gadget, which has input bidder : and output bidder : ′.
Let ?1 denote the probability that bidder : bids 1, as perceived by bidder :
′
. From the construction
of the density function of :′,: and the bounds obtained on the jump points of : in the rst step, it
follows that ?0 = ?3 = ?4 = 0 and ?1 ≥ 1/3. Using Equations (10) to (12) similarly to above, we obtain
that U:′ (0) ≤ 1 + 1/2, U:′ (2) ≥ 3 + 1/2 and U:′ (3) = 5. As before, we have that U:′ (1) ≥ 2 by the
no-overbidding assumption, and using (13) we also obtain that
U:′ (1) = T[U:′ (0),U:′ (2) ]
(
2 + 2?0 + ?1 ± 2Y
?1 + ?2
)
≤ 2 + 1 + 2Y ≤ 3 + 1/4
since Y ≤ 1/8.
Finally, consider the third and last standard base gadget, which has input bidder : ′ and output bidder
8 . Let ?1 denote the probability that bidder :
′
bids 1, as perceived by bidder 8 . From the construction
of the density function of 8,:′ and the bounds obtained on the jump points of :
′
in the previous step,
it follows that ?0 = ?3 = ?4 = 0, ?1 ≥ 1/3 and ?2 ≥ 1/3. Again using Equations (10) to (12) as in the
previous step, we obtain that U8 (0) ≤ 1 + 1/2, U8 (2) ≥ 3 + 1/2 and U8 (3) = 5. Using (13) we have that
U8 (1) = T[U8 (0),U8 (2) ]
(
2 + 2?0 + ?1 ± 2Y
?1 + ?2
)
= 2 + ?1 ± 2Y ∈ [2 + 1/3 − 2Y, 2 + 2/3 + 2Y]
and thus bidder 8 is indeed valid. 
M×2 Gadget. e×2 gadget with input bidder 9 and output bidder 8 , uses an additional auxiliary-bidder
: , and consists of one use of the base gadget and one use of the projection gadget. In more detail, the
base gadget has input 9 , output : and parameters (Wℓ , WA , ℓ, A ) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 1/2), while the projection
gate has input : and output 8 . See Figure 3b for an illustration.
Claim 3. e ×2 gadget with input bidder 9 and output bidder 8 ensures that:
• the output bidder 8 is valid, and
• if the input bidder 9 is valid, then v[8] = T(2 · v[ 9]) ± 24Y.
Proof. e fact that bidder 8 is valid follows from our use of the projection gadget and the rst bullet
point in Claim 2. Now consider the case where bidder 9 is valid. Since Wℓ = WA = 1/3, by Claim 1 we
know that bidder : is also valid and it holds that
v[:] =
T[2+ℓ,2+A ] (U 9 (1)) − (2 + ℓ)
A − ℓ ± 6Y = T[0,1]
(
6U 9 (1) − 14
)
± 6Y = T[0,1] (2 · v[ 9]) ± 6Y.
Since : is valid, we can use the second bullet point in Claim 2, which yields v[8] = v[:] ± 18Y =
T[0,1] (2 · v[ 9]) ± 24Y. 
M1− Gadget. e 1− gadget with input bidder 9 and output bidder 8 uses three additional auxiliary-
bidders :1, :2, :3. First, a base gadget is used with input 9 , output :1 and parameters (Wℓ , WA , ℓ, A ) =
(1/6, 2/3, 1/3, 2/3). Next, the density function of :2,:1 has a block of volume 2/3 in [1 + 1/2, 1 + 3/4],
and a block of volume 1/3 in [4, 5]. en, we use a base gadget with input :2, output :3 and parameters
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(Wℓ , WA , ℓ, A ) = (1/3, 1/3, 2/3, 5/6). Finally, we use a projection gadget with input :3 and output 8 . See
Figure 3c for an illustration.
e crucial idea behind the construction of this gadget is that the third jump point (instead of the
second one) is used to encode information in some intermediate step. is allows us to simulate the
non-monotone operation G ↦→ 1 − G .
Claim 4. e 1− gadget with input bidder 9 and output bidder 8 ensures that:
• the output bidder 8 is valid, and
• if the input bidder 9 is valid, then v[8] = 1 − v[ 9] ± 60Y.
Proof. First of all, note that 8 must be valid, because of the corresponding property of the projection
gadget (Claim 2). Now consider the case where 9 is valid. By Claim 1 it follows that bidder :1 is
almost-valid, in particular U:1 (3) = 5 and U:1 (1) ≤ 3. Let ?1 denote the probability that bidder 9 bids 1,
as perceived by bidder :1. Since 9 is valid, we immediately obtain that ?0 = ?3 = ?4 = 0. Furthermore,
by the construction of :1, 9 , it is easy to see that ?1 = 1/6 + (1 − 1/6 − 2/3)v[ 9] = 1/6 + v[ 9]/6. Next,
using (12) we can write















3 + 1 + ?1 ± 2Y
1 − ?1
)
= 3 + 7/6 + v[ 9]/6
5/6 − v[ 9]/6 ± 3Y
= 4 + 2 + 2v[ 9]
5 − v[ 9] ± 3Y.
Now consider bidder :2. Let ?1 denote the probability that bidder :1 bids 1, as perceived by bidder :2.
By construction of :2,:1 and since :1 is almost-valid, it is easy to see that ?0 = ?4 = 0, ?1 = 2/3 and
?2 + ?3 = 1/3. By the same arguments used in the proof of Claim 1 it follows that U:2 (0) ≤ 1 + 1/2. By
using (11) we obtain U:2 (3) ≥ 4 +
2/3+1/6−Y
1/6 ≥ 5. Next, using (12) we obtain

















Now observe that by construction of :2,:1 and the expression obtained earlier for U:1 (2)
?2 =
T[4,5] (U:1 (2)) − 4
3
=
2 + 2v[ 9]
15 − 3v[ 9] ± Y.





2/3 + 2+2v[ 9 ]
15−3v[ 9 ] ± Y
=
2/3
2/3 + 2+2v[ 9 ]
15−3v[ 9 ]
± 3Y = 5/6 − v[ 9]/6 ± 3Y
where we used Y ≤ 2/15. Finally, using (13) we obtain















2 + 5/6 − v[ 9]/6 ± 3Y ± 2Y
?1 + ?2
)
= 2 + 5/6 − v[ 9]/6 ± 6Y.
Note in particular that bidder :2 is almost-valid, since Y ≤ 1/36.
Since bidder :2 is almost-valid, and we use a base gadget with Wℓ = WA = 1/3 with input :2 and
output :3, it follows by Claim 1 that bidder :3 is valid and
v[:3] =
T[2+ℓ,2+A ] (U:2 (1)) − (2 + 4/6)
1/6 ± 6Y = 1 − v[ 9] ± 42Y.
Finally, the projection gadget with input :3 and output 8 ensures that v[8] = v[:3] ± 18Y = 1 − v[ 9] ±
60Y. 
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M5 Gadget. e q gadget with input bidders 91 and 92 and output bidder 8 is a binary gadget with
additional auxiliary-bidders :1, :2, :3. First of all, for all C ∈ # \ { 91, 92, :1}, we set :1,C to have density
function with a single block of volume 1 in [0, 1]. We set both :1, 91 and :1, 92 to be distributions
as in our construction of the base gadget with parameters (Wℓ , WA , ℓ, A ) = (1/20, 8/20, 1/3, 2/3). e
density function of :2,:1 has a block of volume 1/2 in [1 + 1/2, 1 + 3/4], and a block of volume 1/2
in [3 + 1/2, 5]. Next, we use a base gadget with input :2, output :3 and parameters (Wℓ , WA , ℓ, A ) =
(1/3, 1/3(1 + 1/4), 104/200, 779/800). Finally, we use a 1− gadget with input :3 and output 8 . See
Figure 4 for an illustration. We have the following claim.
Claim 5. e q gadget with input bidders 91, 92 and output bidder 8 ensures that:
• the output bidder 8 is valid, and
• if the input bidders 91 and 92 are valid, then
v[8] = q (v[ 91], v[ 92]) ± 86Y =
1
4
(v[ 91] + 1) (v[ 92] + 1) ± 86Y.
Proof. Bidder 8 is guaranteed to be valid, because it is the output bidder of the1− gadget (Claim 4). Now
assume that 91 and 92 are valid. Let ?1 denote the probability that bidder 91 bids 1, as perceived by bidder
:1. Similarly, let@1 denote the probability that bidder 92 bids1, as perceived by bidder :1. By construction
of :1, 91 and :1, 92 , and because 91 and 92 are valid, we know that ?0 = ?3 = ?4 = @0 = @3 = @4 = 0,
?1, @1 ≥ 1/20 and ?2, @2 ≥ 8/20. Recall that :1 (1) is used to denote the probability that bidder :1 wins
if she bids 1 (from :1’s perspective). us we immediately obtain that :1 (0) = 0, :1 (1) = ?1@1/3,
:1 (2) = ?1@1 + ?2@1/2 + ?1@2/2 + ?2@2/3 = 1/3 + (?1 + @1)/6 + ?1@1/3 and :1 (3) = :1 (4) = 1. With
this in hand, we now obtain (just as we did for Equations (10) to (13)):
U:1 (0) ≤ 1 +
:1 (0) + Y
:1 (1) − :1 (0)
= 1 + Y
?1@1/3
≤ 1 + 1200Y ≤ 1 + 1/2
since Y ≤ 1/2400. Similarly, since :1 (4) −:1 (3) = 0 and :1 (3) = 1 > Y, we have that U:1 (3) = 5. We
also have
U:1 (1) ≤ 2 +
:1 (1) + Y
:1 (2) − :1 (1)
≤ 2 + ?1@1/3 + Y
1/3 + (?1 + @1)/6
≤ 3
where we used the bounds we have on these probabilities and Y ≤ 1/4. Finally, we have







:1 (2) ± Y




3 + 1/3 + (?1 + @1)/6 + ?1@1/3 ± Y
1 − (1/3 + (?1 + @1)/6 + ?1@1/3)
)
= 3 + 1 + (?1 + @1)/2 + ?1@1
2 − (?1 + @1)/2 − ?1@1
± 3Y




(?1 + @1)/2 + ?1@1
2 − (?1 + @1)/2 − ?1@1
± 3Y
where we used the fact that
(?1+@1)/2+?1@1
2−(?1+@1)/2−?1@1 ≤ 1, since ?1, @1 ≤ 12/20. As ?1, @1 ≥ 1/20 and Y ≤ 1/60,
we also have that U:1 (2) ≥ 3 + 1/2. In particular, :1 is almost-valid. Note that since 91 and 92 are valid,
we have ?1 = 1/20 + 11v[ 91]/20 and @1 = 1/20 + 11v[ 92]/20.
Next, we consider bidder :2. Let ?
′
1
denote the probability that bidder :1 bids 1, as perceived by
bidder :2. By the previous paragraph, we have ?
′
0
= 0, ? ′
1










(?1 + @1)/2 + ?1@1
2 − (?1 + @1)/2 − ?1@1
± 3Y = 1
2
(?1 + @1)/2 + ?1@1
2 − (?1 + @1)/2 − ?1@1
± 3Y
where we used the fact that the height of the block of volume of :2,:1 in [3 + 1/2, 5] is 1/3. Since
the density function of :2,:1 has a block of volume 1/2 in [1 + 1/2, 1 + 3/4], as before we obtain that
U:2 (0) ≤ 1 + 1/2. Using (11) and (12), we also have
























































(a) e Projection gadget.














Input: : Output: 8
×2 Gadget
(b) e ×2 gadget.














Input: :3 Output: 8
1− Gadget




























(c) e 1− gadget.
Figure 3: e Projection, ×2 and1− gadgets. e probability density functions of the corresponding
subjective priors are shown.
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Input: :3 Output: 8
q Gadget






























Figure 4: e q gadget. e probability density functions of the corresponding subjective priors are
shown.
as well as



















≥ 3 + 1/2.
Finally, (13) yields






















©­«2 + 1/21/2 + 12 (?1+@1)/2+?1@12−(?1+@1)/2−?1@1 ± 3Y ª®¬ ± 4Y
= 2 + 2 − (?1 + @1)/2 − ?1@1
2
± 10Y.
Substituting in ?1 = 1/20 + 11v[ 91]/20 and @1 = 1/20 + 11v[ 92]/20, we compute
U:2 (1) = 2 + 1 + 1/8 −
1
2
(11/20 + 11v[ 91]/20) (11/20 + 11v[ 92]/20) ± 10Y
= 2 + 9/8 − 121
200
q (v[ 91], v[ 92]) ± 10Y.
Note that we have U:2 (1) ∈ [2 + 104/200, 2 + 779/800] ± 10Y. In particular, bidder :2 is almost-valid.
Since bidder:3 is the output of a base gadget with input:2 and parameters (Wℓ , WA , ℓ, A ) = (1/3, 1/3(1+
1/4), 104/200, 779/800), it follows by Claim 1 that :3 is valid and
v[:3] = 3(1 − Wℓ − WA )
T[2+ℓ,2+A ] (U:2 (1)) − (2 + ℓ)









2 + 9/8 − 121
200
q (v[ 91], v[ 92]) − (2 + 104/200)
)
± 26Y
= 1 − q (v[ 91], v[ 92]) ± 26Y.
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Finally, it is easy to see that the 1− gadget with input :3 and output 8 ensures the desired value for
bidder 8 (Claim 4). 
Finishing the proof. Using the gadgets we have described above we can now enforce the constraints
of the Gcircuit instance. Indeed, for each gate 68 = (, 9, :) where  ∈ G = {×2,1−,q }, it suces
to use the gadget corresponding to the gate-type  , with output bidder 8 and input bidder 9 (as well
as : , in the case  = q ). Since the distributions are subjective, we can re-use a bidder 9 as an input
to multiple dierent gadgets, without any interference. By Claims 3 to 5 it immediately follows that
the gate-bidders 1, 2, . . . ,m must all be valid, since each of them is the output of some gadget. But this
means that for any gate 68 = (, 9, :), the input bidder 9 (and : , if applicable) will be valid, because
she is also a gate-bidder. As a result, again by Claims 3 to 5, it follows that the gadgets will correctly
enforce their constraints on all values v[8].
To obtain a solution, it suces to set v[68] := v[8] for all 8 ∈ [m]. For the case Y = 0, note
that since every gate-bidder 8 is valid, we have that U8 (1) ∈ [2 + 1/3, 2 + 2/3] and as a result v[8] =
T[0,1] (3(U8 (1) − 2 − 1/3)) = 3(U8 (1) − 2 − 1/3), which indeed yields an SL-reduction [Etessami and
Yannakakis, 2010]. By scaling back to the original value space [0, 1], the proof yields that for all
Y ∈ [0, 1/105], from any Y-BNE of the auction we can extract an 500Y-satisfying assignment for the
generalized circuit. As discussed at the beginning of the section, this yields both PPAD- and FIXP-
hardness.
6 An Ecient Algorithm for a Constant Number of Bidders and Bids
In this section, we design an algorithm which computes an Y-Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the FPA when
(a) the number of bidders = is constant, (b) the size of the bidding space | | is constant, and (c) the value
distributions 8, 9 of the bidders are piecewise polynomial.
To be more precise, our input comprises of:
- a set of bids
9  = {10, 11, . . . , 1 | |−1} ⊂ [0, 1]
- a partition
10
of [0, 1] into  intervals [Gℓ−1, Gℓ ], ℓ = {1, 2, . . . ,  }, with rational endpoints
- for each distribution 8, 9 and each subinterval [Gℓ−1, Gℓ ], a vector of rationals (08, 9,ℓ0 , 0
8, 9,ℓ
1




en, (the cumulative distribution function of) 8, 9 is dened as
8, 9 (I) =  ℓ8, 9 (I), for I ∈ [Gℓ−1, Gℓ ],
where








is the polynomial representation of 8, 9 in the ℓ-th interval. Of course, the input should respect the
conditions
 18, 9 (0) ≥ 0,  8,9 (1) = 1,  ℓ8, 9 (Gℓ ) =  ℓ+18, 9 (Gℓ ) for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . ,  − 1,
and that each  ℓ8, 9 is nondecreasing on [Gℓ−1, Gℓ ].
Finally, when we say that = and | | are xed, we mean that they are constant functions of the other
parameters of the input.
We have the following theorem.
9
Recall that here | | is xed, i.e., not part of the input.
10
Our assumption here of a common interval partition for the piecewise polynomial representation of all subjective priors
8, 9 is for the sake of simplicity, and it is not critical for the positive results of this section. In particular, it is not dicult to see




] with just a polynomial blow-up in the size of the representation;




eorem 6.1. For a xed number of bidders, a xed bidding space, and piecewise polynomial value
distributions, an Y-BNE of the rst-price auction can be computed in polynomial time, even for subjective
priors and even when Y is inversely-exponential in the input size.
e remainder of the section is devoted to developing the algorithm that will prove eorem 6.1.
At a high level, the algorithm will perform the following four steps:
1. It “guesses”, for each bidder, an assignment of the jump points of her best-response strategy to the
 sub-intervals [Gℓ−1, Gℓ ] above; intervals may be allocated zero or multiple jump points. Since
the number of bidders and the size of the bidding space are constant, there is a total constant
number of jump points for all bidders. erefore, this “guessing” step is an enumeration of all
such possible assignments; the subsequent steps of the algorithm are run for any such assignment.
2. It “guesses” a set of eective jump points and bids. is is a technical corner case, to eliminate
degenerate cases in which multiple jump points coincide. Again, this can be done via enumeration
given that the number of jump points is constant.
3. It formulates the problem of nding the exact positions of the eective jump points (within the
intervals corresponding to the guessed allocation above) as a system of polynomial inequalities of
polynomially-large degree. A X-approximate solution to this system can be found using standard
methods, in time polynomial in log(1/X) and the input parameters.
4. It “projects” the approximate solution to the “equilibrium space”, as dened by the constraints of
the aforementioned system, ensuring that the resulting object is indeed an Y-BNE, for some Y that
can be made as small as needed, by making X as small as needed.
Below we describe these steps in more detail.
Step 1: Guessing an allocation of jump points to intervals
Recall the denition of the jump points U8 (1) from Section 2, which represent the equilibrium strategy
of bidder 8 . Intuitively, U8 (1) is the largest value for which bidder 8 would bid 1 or lower. Since | | is
constant, there is a constant number of such jump points for each bidder, and since = is also constant,
there is a constant number of jump points overall. e algorithm enumerates over all the possible ways
of assigning the = · ( | | − 1) jump points to the intervals [Gℓ−1, Gℓ ], for ℓ = 1, . . . ,  ; this can be done in
time $ ( = | |). en, for any possible such allocation, it moves to the next step. We introduce variables
~8, 9 , 9 = 1, 2, . . . , | | − 1 for the positions of the jump points of the strategy of bidder 8 in [0, 1], and we
set ~8,0 = 0, ~8, | | = 1.
Step 2: Guessing a set of eective jump points and bids
We “guess” possible “collisions” of sequential jump points, where a collision happens when the positions
of two or more jump points coincide. In that case, we would like to only keep a single representative
from each coinciding jump point; the positions of these representatives are denoted using the variables
I8 9 . We also use the variables 1
′
8, 9 to denote the corresponding bids, as subscribed by the chosen jump
points. We refer to the chosen jump points and bids as eective jump points and bids respectively. See
Figure 5 for an illustration.
Formally, this corresponds to picking, for each bidder 8 , an (increasing) subsequence `8 ( 9) ⊆ {1, . . . , | |−
1}, such that
































Figure 5: An illustration of the selection of eective jump points (1 ′) and eective bids (I ′), for | | = 6.
In the gure, jump points 3 and 4 coincide, and therefore among those, only jump point 4 will be in the
sequence used in the next step. Also, bid 13 is never used in the best-response function, as the strategy
jumps directly from 12 to 14, and therefore 13 will be excluded from the set of eective bids. In the end,
the eective jump points would be 1, 2, 4 and 5 and the eective bids will be 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15.
Notice that<8 ≤ | |. Given the “guessing” in the current step, we let !8, 9 , '8, 9 denote the le and right,
respectively, endpoints of the sub-interval in which the 9-th eective break point of player 8 lies; i.e.,
I8, 9 ∈ [!8, 9 , '8, 9 ]. For ease of notation, we also use the shortcut 1 ′8, 9 = 1`8 ( 9) for the 9-th eective bid of
player 8 .
Again, since | | is constant, we can enumerate over all possible eective jump point subsequences
`8 in constant time and for each such subsequence, we proceed to the next step.
Step 3: Solving a system of polynomial inequalities
From the previous two steps we have, for each bidder 8 , an assignment of eective jump points
I8,0, . . . , I8,<8 to intervals [Gℓ−1, Gℓ ]. In particular, I8, 9 is mapped to [!8, 9 , '8, 9 ]. Below, we express all the
properties that must be satised by the eective jump points at an (exact) BNE of the FPA as a system
of polynomial inequalities; the system includes inequalities to ensure
- that the positions of the jump points of each bidder 8 respect the ordering implied by the set of
indices, i.e., I8, 9−1 < I8, 9 for all 9 = 1, . . . ,<8 ,
- that the bidding strategies are non-overbidding,
- that the variables I8, 9 indeed correspond to jump points of best-responses, in terms of the impli-
cations to the utility functions.
I8, 9−1 < I8, 9 ∀8, ∀9 (15)
!8 9 ≤ I8, 9 ≤ '8 9 ∀8, ∀9 (16)
I8, 9 ≥ 1 ′8, 9 ∀8, ∀9 (17)
D8 (1 ′8, 9 , z−8 ; I8, 9 ) ≥ D8 (1, z−8 ; I8, 9 ) ∀8, ∀9, ∀1 < 1 ′8, 9 (18)
D8 (1 ′8, 9−1, z−8 ; I8, 9 ) ≥ D8 (1, z−8 ; I8, 9 ) ∀8, ∀9, ∀1 > 1 ′8, 9−1 (19)
Lemma 6.2. Fix a bidder 8 and a bid 1 ∈ . en, for every 9 = 1, . . . ,<8 , her utility D8 (1, z−8 ; I8, 9 ) can





8′∈#, 9 ′=0,...,<8 .
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Proof. Without loss of generality, similar to what we did in the proof of Lemma 3.2, we will show
the lemma from the perspective of bidder =. Fix an index 9 = 0, . . . ,<= for an eective jump point
I=,9 ∈ [!=,9 , '=,9 ], and consider a bid 1. en, importing some notation from our proof of Lemma 3.2,
the utility of player = when she has a true value of E= = I=,9 is
D= (1, z−= ; I=,9 ) = = (1, z−=) (I=,9 − 1),
where = (1, z−=) is the probability that bidder = wins the item. Due to (5) and (6) (and the fact that = is
now constant), it is enough to show that, for any bidder 8 ≤ = − 1, the quantities 8,1− and 68,1 , dened
in the proof of Lemma 3.2, are polynomials of the jump point variables I8′, 9 ′ . Furthermore, to guarantee
a maximum degree of 3=, as in the statement of our lemma, it is enough to show that each of these
polynomials are of degree at most 3 : the number of factors in the products appearing as summands
in (6) are at most =.
Recall that 8,1− and 68,1 are the probabilities (from the perspective of bidder =) that bidder 8
bids below 1 and exactly 1, respectively. So, if 1 = 1 ′
8, 9 ′ for some index 9
′ = 0, 1, . . . ,<8 − 1, then
8,1− = =,9 (I8, 9 ′) and 68,1 = =,9 (I8, 9 ′+1) − =,9 (I8, 9 ′). If, on the other hand, 1 ′8, 9 ′ < 1 < 1 ′8, 9 ′+1 for an index
9 ′, then 8,1− = =,9 (I8, 9 ′) and 68,1 = 0. In any case, deploying the representation from (14), quantities
8,1− and 68,1 can indeed be wrien (in polynomial time with respect to the input of the problem) as
polynomials, of degree at most 3 , of the jump point variables. 
As the following lemma suggests, a solution to System (15)–(19) corresponds to a BNE of the
rst-price auction. Note that although the existence of a BNE is guaranteed by eorem 4.1, it might be
the case that the equilibrium strategies are not consistent with the specic “preliminary” guesses of
Steps 1 and 2 that gave rise to the particular instantiation of System (15)–(19) above. However, there
has to exist some guess for which the system has a solution, and since we are enumerating over all
possible choices, we are guaranteed to nd it.
Lemma 6.3. Given the “guessed” allocations of jump points to intervals and the “guessed” eective jump
points and bids, a compatible BNE of the FPA exists if and only if System (15)–(19) has a solution.
Proof. Immediate by the characterization of BNE in Lemma 3.1 (using Y = 0), by seing U8 (1−) = I8, 9 in
condition (3) and U8 (1) = I8, 9 in (4). 
Step 4: “Projecting” back to the equilibrium domain
From Step 3 above, we know that by solving System (15)–(19) we can compute an exact BNE of the
auction. More precisely, we can compute a X-approximation to System (15)–(19) in time polynomial in
log(1/X), by making use of the following result by Grigor’ev and Vorobjov [1988, Remark, p. 38]:
eorem 6.4. For any X ∈ (0, 1], it is possible to nd a rational X-approximation to System (15)–(19) in
time polynomial in log(1/X) and the size of the input.
By X-approximation here, we mean a point which is geometrically close, with respect to the max
norm, to an exact solution of System (15)–(19). is is almost a strong approximation to an exact BNE; if
we were to translate this point to a feasible strategy prole, it would yield jump points which are close
to the jump points of an exact equilibrium strategy. However, these would only approximately satisfy
the conditions in System (15)–(19); in particular special care should be taken for the monotonicity and
no-overbidding conditions, which we want to be satised exactly, rather than approximately.
To remedy this, we must rst “project” the X-approximate solution of System (15)–(19) back to
the equilibrium domain D introduced in the proof of eorem 4.1. Formally, let us denote by z the
X-approximate solution of System (15)–(19), and by z∗ the exact solution which it approximates, so that
‖z − z∗‖∞ ≤ X . We compute the projection z̃ from z as
Ĩ8,0 = 0 and Ĩ8, 9 = T[max{1′
8,9
,Ĩ8,9−1 },1] (I8, 9 ).
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Our next claim is that ‖z̃ − z∗‖∞ ≤ X as well. is is equivalent to saying that |Ĩ8, 9 − I∗8, 9 | ≤ X for every
8, 9 , which can be done by induction on 9 , the base case 9 = 0 being trivial. For 9 > 0, observe that Ĩ8, 9
must coincide with one of 1 ′8, 9 , Ĩ8, 9−1, 1, I8, 9 .
• If Ĩ8, 9 = I8, 9 then obviously |Ĩ8, 9 − I∗8, 9 | ≤ X .
• If Ĩ8, 9 = 1
′
8, 9 then we must have had I8, 9 ≤ 1 ′8, 9 . Since I∗8, 9 ≥ 1 ′8, 9 and |I8, 9 − I∗8, 9 | ≤ X , we must also
have |Ĩ8, 9 − I∗8, 9 | ≤ X .
• Similarly, if Ĩ8, 9 = 1 then we must have had I8, 9 ≥ 1. Since I∗8, 9 ≤ 1 and |I8, 9 − I∗8, 9 | ≤ X , we must
also have |Ĩ8, 9 − I∗8, 9 | ≤ X .
• Finally, suppose Ĩ8, 9 = Ĩ8, 9−1. en we must have had I8, 9 ≤ Ĩ8, 9−1. Using the induction hypothesis,
we have that Ĩ8, 9−1 ≤ I∗8, 9−1 + X ≤ I∗8, 9 + X ; thus we also have |Ĩ8, 9 − I∗8, 9 | ≤ X .
erefore, z̃ constitutes a valid monotone non-decreasing, non-overbidding joint strategy prole,
which is within distance X of the exact BNE z∗. In other words, z̃ is a valid joint strategy prole that is a
strong X-approximation to a BNE.
Finally, we need to show that if X is chosen to be suciently small, then any strong X-approximate
BNE is also an Y-BNE of the auction. For this, we use the fact that the family of piecewise polynomial
distributions is polynomially continuous (see Appendix A for the formal denition). Indeed, given such a
piecewise polynomial distribution, it is easy to see that it must be Lipschitz-continuous, and, crucially, we
can in polynomial time compute a corresponding Lipschitz-constant. (Note that any polynomial function
 (I 9 ) = 00 + 01I 9 + . . . + 03I39 is  -Lipschitz-continuous over [0, 1], where  = |01 | + 2|02 | + . . . 3 |03 |.)
With this observation in hand, we can now use Lemma 4.3 to eciently construct X > 0 suciently
small such that for all 8 ∈ # , 1 ∈  and E8 ∈ [0, 1]
‖z − z ′‖∞ ≤ X =⇒ |D8 (1, z−8 ; E8) − D8 (1, z ′−8 ; E8) | ≤ Y/2.
Since z̃ is a strong X-approximation, i.e., ‖z̃ − z∗‖∞ ≤ X , it immediately follows that inequalities (18) and
(19) of the System are satised with additive error at most Y. Using Lemma 3.1, it immediately follows
that z̃ is an Y-BNE.
As a result, to summarize, given Y > 0 and the problem instance, we can in polynomial time compute
X > 0 such that running the algorithm described in this section is guaranteed to nd an Y-BNE. Since
the number of agents and bids is xed, and the algorithm runs in polynomial time in log(1/X) and the
instance size, eorem 6.1 follows.
7 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper, we have classied the complexity of computing a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the rst-price
auction with subjective priors, by proving that it is PPAD-complete. As we explained in the introduction,
our result contributes fundamentally to our understanding of this celebrated auction format, as well as
the literature on total search problems and TFNP. e challenging next step is to move towards the
special case of the common priors assumption, where the value distribution of each bidder is common
knowledge (8, 9 = 8′, 9 for all 8, 8
′
). Our PPAD-membership result obviously already extends to this case,
as it is a special case of the subjective priors seing. e really intriguing question is to extend our
PPAD-hardness result to this case as well. To this end, we state the following open problem, which
we consider to be one of the most important problems both in computational game theory and in the
literature of total search problems.
Open Problem. What is the complexity of computing an Y-Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the rst-price
auction with common priors? Is it PPAD-complete? Is it polynomial-time solvable? Or could it be complete
for some other (smaller) sub-class of PPAD?
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A potential candidate for such a smaller class could be the class PPAD ∩ PLS, which was recently
shown by Fearnley et al. [2021] and Babichenko and Rubinstein [2021] to capture the complexity of
interesting problems related to optimization via gradient descent, and computing mixed Nash equilibria
in congestion games [Rosenthal, 1973] respectively. e class PLS was introduced by Johnson et al. [1988]
and captures the computation of local minima of some objective function, and notably characterizes the
complexity of nding pure Nash equilibria in congestion games [Fabrikant et al., 2004].
Another very meaningful question is to study the case where both the value distributions and the
bidding space are discrete. A special case of this seing was studied by Escamocher et al. [2009], but
they only obtained conclusive results for the case of two bidders with bi-valued distributions. We believe
that some of our technical contributions (e.g., the computation of the best response functions or the
gadgets used in the PPAD-hardness proof) can be adapted to show similar results for that case as well;
we leave the details for future work. Finally, it would be very interesting to identify further tractable
special cases for our problem; for example, can we obtain a positive result similar to eorem 6.1 for
more general value distributions?
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Renato Paes Leme, and Éva Tardos. Bounding the ineciency of outcomes in generalized second
price auctions. Journal of Economic eory, 156:343–388, March 2015. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.010.
29
Shuchi Chawla and Jason D. Hartline. Auctions with unique equilibria. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM
conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pages 181–196, 2013. doi:10.1145/2492002.2483188.
Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, and Shang-Hua Teng. Seling the complexity of computing two-player Nash
equilibria. Journal of the ACM, 56(3):14:1–14:57, May 2009. doi:10.1145/1516512.1516516.
Xi Chen, Dimitris Paparas, and Mihalis Yannakakis. e complexity of non-monotone markets. Journal
of the ACM, 64(3):1–56, June 2017. doi:10.1145/3064810.
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APPENDIX
A e Input Model for the Value Distributions
Let F be a class of cumulative distribution functions on the interval [0, 1]. In other words, for any
 ∈ F and any G ∈ [0, 1],  (G) is the probability of the interval [0, G] according to  . For every  ∈ F ,
let size( ) denote the representation size of  , i.e., the number of bits needed to represent  . (Here we
implicitly assume that some representation scheme is given in the denition of F .)
For any rational number G , let size(G) denote the representation size of G , namely the length of the
binary representation of the denominator and numerator of G . e denitions in this section are based
on the corresponding notions introduced by Etessami and Yannakakis [2010].
Denition 4. A class of cumulative distribution functions F is polynomially computable, if there exists
some polynomial ? such that for all  ∈ F and all rational G ∈ [0, 1],  (G) can be computed in time
? (size( ) + size(G)).
In order to guarantee the existence of approximate equilibria with polynomial representation size we
add an extra requirement on F .
Denition 5. A class of cumulative distribution functions F is polynomially continuous, if there exists
some polynomial @ such that for all  ∈ F and all rational Y > 0, there exists rational X > 0 with
size(X) ≤ @(size( ) + size(Y)) such that
| (G) −  (~) | ≤ Y
for all G,~ ∈ [0, 1] with |G − ~ | ≤ X .
Note that distribution functions given by piecewise-constant density functions on the interval [0, 1]
are an example of such a class of polynomially-computable and polynomially-continuous F . e
density functions are represented explicitly, i.e., as a list of “blocks”, where for every block we give the
sub-interval of [0, 1] that it occupies and the height of the block.
B Impossibilities for Implicit Bidding Spaces
In Section 2, we emphasized that it is necessary for our computational problem to have the bidding
space explicitly as part of the input, as otherwise it is hard to even compute the best responses of the
auction. We provide more details on this topic in this section.
If the bidding space  ⊆ [0, 1] is discrete but represented in some implicit way, this immediately
gives rise to some computational obstacles. When we proved in Section 3 that best-responses could
be computed eciently, our procedure essentially goes over all possible bids, and checks which bid
achieves the highest utility. If the bidding space is large (say, exponential in the input size), this approach
is no longer ecient. In fact, in this subsection we will prove that, essentially, one cannot hope to nd
a beer approach; in particular, we provide lower bounds from an information-theoretical as well as a
computational perspective.
For simplicity, in this subsection we will assume that the bidding space is the set of all rational





| 0 ≤ ? ≤ 2<
}
,
where< is part of the input and given in unary representation. Notice that each bid can then be encoded
by a binary string of size< (with the exception of the bid 1, which can be encoded with< + 1 bits).
We will also assume that there are only two bidders, each having a valuation over the unit interval,
+ = [0, 1]. is is arguably the simplest natural example one could consider.
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As we explained in Section 2 we can identify a strategy by its set of jump points
U8 (1) = sup{E | V8 (E) ≤ 1 }.
Intuitively, U8 (1) is the largest value for which player 8 would bid 1 or lower. At this point we have two
options on how to represent the functions U8 :
- Black-box model: in the black-box model we have access to an oracle that, given a bid 1 ∈ ,
returns the corresponding jump point U8 (1).
- White-box model: in the white-box model we have an algorithm that, given a bid 1 ∈ ,
computes the jump point U8 (1). For example, this could be given by a circuit. Alternatively, we
can assume that U8 is a function computable in polynomial time.
In both cases we need to describe how the jump points themselves are represented. For simplicity, we
just assume that all jump points are rational quantities (as we are going for a hardness result).
Besides the inverse bidding strategies, we also need to represent the cumulative density functions
8 : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. Here similar considerations apply, or we can use the notions in Appendix A.
Now, given 8 and U8 , an important quantity of interest is
Π8 (1) = 8 (U8 (1));
since U8 (1) is the largest value for which bidder 8 will bid 1 or lower, and 8 (U8 (1)) is the probability
that bidder 8’s valuation is at most this value, it turns out that Π8 (1) can be very naturally interpreted
as the probability that player 8 bids on or below 1. Notice that we can then get the probability that
player 8 bids exactly 1 as Π8 (1) −Π8 (1−), where 1− is the bid immediately below 1, for 1 > 0. Regarding
the computation of Π8 , it will be either a black-box or white-box computation, depending on whether
we have assumed U8 and 8 to be given in a black-box or white-box fashion.
As we already mentioned, in our reduction we will consider only two bidders. We shall x the
second bidder’s bidding strategy and cumulative distribution function throughout the reduction, and
look at the best-response of bidder 1. For ease of notation, we will drop the subscript 2 and write
U, ,Π instead of U2, 2,Π2; there will be no confusion since we will never look at bidder 1’s valuation
distribution or bidding strategy. Given a bid 1, we can express the probability that bidder 1 wins the
auction when bidding 1, denoted by  (1), as
 (0) = 1
2
Π(0);












Finally, we wish to maximize the utility of bidder 1; when she has a valuation of E and bids 1, this is
given by D (E, 1) =  (1) (E − 1).
Now that we have given the preliminaries of our reduction, let us go into the construction. Let
us x some< ≥ 3 and dene a baseline instance. We will want to choose a bidding strategy U and
distribution  for bidder 2, so that the resulting function Π(·) is given as follows.
Π(0) = Π(2−<) = Π(2 · 2−<) = 0;
Π(1 − 2−<) = Π(1) = Π(1 + 2−<) = Π(1 + 2 · 2−<)
=
1
2(1 − 1) , for 1 = ? · 2
−<, ? a multiple of 4, and1 ≤ 1
2
;
Π(1) = 1 for 1 ≥ 1
2
.
Our function Π essentially corresponds to a discrete probability distribution on the bids with the
following properties. First, it only has mass at points of the form (4: − 1) · 2−< , for positive integer
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: , where 4: − 1 < 2<−1. Second, the mass at 3 · 2−< equals 1
2(1−4·2−<) , whereas for : ≥ 2 the mass
at (4: − 1) · 2−< equals 1
2(1−4: ·2−<) −
1
2(1−(4:−1) ·2−<) . To yield the desired Π, we can for example take
 (G) = G , corresponding to the uniform distribution on [0, 1], and U (1) = Π(1) dened as above.
Given the probability distribution Π on the bids of player 2, we are interested in computing the
best-response strategy for player 1. In fact, we will do so for the case that player 1’s valuation equals 1.
If we can show it is hard to compute the best-response for this value, then it follows that it is hard to
compute the best-response strategy function in general. Using the denition of  (1), we can write
 (0) = 0;  (2−<) = 0;  (2 · 2−<) = 0;  (3 · 2−<) 1
4(1 − 4 · 2−<) ;
for 1 = ? · 2−< , ? a multiple of 4, and 1 ≤ 1
2
− 4 · 2−< ,
 (1) = 1
2(1 − 1) ;  (1 + 2
−<) = 1
2(1 − 1) ;  (1 + 2 · 2
−<) = 1
2(1 − 1) ;
 (1 + 3 · 2−<) = 1
4(1 − 1) +
1
4(1 − 1 − 4 · 2−<) ;
nally, for 1 ≥ 1/2,




Figure 6: Depiction of the baseline construction.  (1) denotes the probability of player 1 winning the
auction when bidding 1, and is represented by the blue circles. We also plot in dashed line the auxiliary
function G ↦→ 1
2(1−G) .
A graphical depiction of  (1) can be found in Figure 6. It is not hard to check that, for every bid 1,
we have that
 (1) ≤ 1
2(1 − 1) ;
moreover, this is achieved with equality for every bid of the form 1 = ? · 2−< , for ? a multiple of
4, as long as 1 ≤ 1/2. erefore, the maximum utility that player 1 can achieve is 1/2, and all such
multiple-of-four bids are equally best-responses.
Now that we understand the baseline instance, we can construct a family of “perturbed” instances
that will be used in our reduction. For a xed subset ( ⊆ {0, 1}<−3 of binary strings of size< − 3, we
will dene a corresponding Π( , ( as follows. Π( and ( coincide with Π and  on every bid 1 ≥ 1/2.
For the bids smaller than 1/2, we can write their binary expansion as a sequence of< bits, the rst of
which is 0. For example, if< = 4, then the bid 3/24 can be wrien as 0011. For every G ∈ {0, 1}<−3, if
G ∉ ( , then Π( and ( coincide with Π and  for bids of the form 0G1112; in particular, if 1 = G · 2<−2,
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• if G = 0 · · · 0, then we have Π( (0) = 0, Π( (2−<) = 0, Π( (2 · 2−<) = 0, Π( (3 · 2−<) = 1
2(1−4·2−<) ;
• otherwise, we have Π( (1) = 1
2(1−1) , Π( (1+2
−<) = 1
2(1−1) , Π( (1+2·2
−<) = 1




On the other hand, for G ∈ ( and 1 = G · 2−<+2, Π( is obtained from Π by shiing the mass at
1 + 3 · 2−< to 1 + 2−< ; in other words,
• ifG = 0 · · · 0, then we haveΠ( (0) = 0, Π( (2−<) = 1
2(1−4·2−<) , Π( (2·2
−<) = 1




• otherwise, we have Π( (1) = 1
2(1−1) , Π( (1 + 2
−<) = 1
2(1−1−4·2−<) , Π( (1 + 2 · 2
−<) = 1
2(1−1−4·2−<) ,
Π( (1 + 3 · 2−<) = 1
2(1−1−4·2−<) .
is gives rise to a change in ( as well:







• otherwise, we have ( (1) = 1




4(1−1−4·2−<) , ( (1 + 2 · 2
−<) =
1
2(1−1−4·2−<) , ( (1 + 3 · 2
−<) = 1
2(1−1−4·2−<) .
Similarly as above, we can dene an U( for player 2 that give rise to this choice of Π( and ( . e
net eect of our construction is that, for G ∉ ( , the bids of the form 0G00, 0G01, 0G10 and 0G11 achieve
the same utility in both the baseline and the perturbed instances (and thus, at most 1/2); but if G ∈ ( ,
the bids of the form 0G01, 0G10, 0G11 now achieve higher utility; in fact, if G ∈ ( , then bidding 0G10
achieves a utility strictly higher than 1/2. Writing 1 = G · 2−<+2, we can see that
D (1, 1 + 2 · 2−<) = 1 − 1 − 2 · 2
−<




We want to nd an Y that bounds the utility gap, in order to show that computing Y-best-responses is
hard. Using the trivial bound that 1 − 1 − 4 · 2−< < 1, it turns out that Y ≤ 2−< is small enough:
D (1, 1 + 2 · 2−<) − 1
2
=
1 − 1 − 2 · 2−<
2(1 − 1 − 4 · 2−<) −
1 − 1 − 4 · 2−<
2(1 − 1 − 4 · 2−<) =
2 · 2−<
2(1 − 1 − 4 · 2−<) > 2
−< .
0G00 0G01 0G10 0G11 0G+00
 (1)( (1)
Figure 7: Depiction of the baseline construction. ( (1) denotes the probability of player 1 winning
the auction when bidding 1, and is represented by the upper blue circles. ese are higher than the
probabilities in  (1) (lower blue circles), and go above the function G ↦→ 1
2(1−G) (dashed line). Here
0G+00 represents the binary string immediately aer 0G11.
We can depict the change from function  to function ( as in Figure 7. To conclude this section,
we just need to prove that one cannot distinguish between  and ( unless we explicitly compute
utilities for a large number possible bids.
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eorem B.1. Consider a FPA where the bidding space corresponds to all dyadic rationals of order<, and
bidding strategies are represented implicitly according to the black-box model. en, any algorithm that
computes Y-best-responses, for Y ≤ 2−< , makes an exponential number of queries in the worst-case.
Proof. Let  be an algorithm that computes exact best-responses. Fix an integer< ≥ 3, the number
of players to be 2, and run the algorithm  for the baseline instance, where player 2 bids according
to function  , and player 1’s value is xed to 1. Suppose that  makes less than 2<−3 − 1 queries; let
& be the set of queries made by , and 1 be the bid returned by . Next, notice that there are 2<−3
disjoint sets of bids of the form {0G01, 0G10, 0G11}, one for each G ∈ {0, 1}<−3. Since  makes less than
2
<−3 − 1 queries, it follows that there must exist some G for which none of 0G01, 0G10, 0G11 belongs
to & ∪ {1}. Now consider the perturbed instance G , that is, we take ( = {G}. Notice that ( and Π(
coincide with  and Π everywhere except at {0G01, 0G10, 0G11}; therefore, running  on the instance
G would produce the same answers on all queries, and so would produce the same best-response bid
of 1. However, by our construction we know that bidding 1 gives an utility of at most 1/2, whereas
bidding according to the string 0G1 gives an utility strictly higher than 1/2 + Y. Hence, the algorithm
would not give a correct answer. We conclude that any algorithm for computing best-responses would
have to make at least 2
<−3 − 1 queries. 
eorem B.2. Consider a FPA where the bidding space corresponds to all dyadic rationals of order<,
and bidding strategies are represented implicitly according to the white-box model. en, computing
Y-best-responses, for exponentially small Y, is an NP-hard optimization problem.
Proof. Let P be any problem in NP. Without loss of generality assume that certicates for instances
of size = must all have size ? (=), for some polynomial ? . Given an input ~ for P, let ( (~) = {G ∈
{0, 1}? (=) : G is a valid certicate for ~} ⊆ {0, 1}? (=) be the set of valid certicates for ~. In other
words, ~ is a yes-instance if and only if ( (~) ≠ ∅; and there is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given
G,~, decides whether G ∈ ( (~).
We can dene our reduction, from P to the problem of computing best-responses, as follows. Given
an input ~ of size =, consider a rst-price auction where:
• < = ? (=) + 3 and Y = 2−< ;
• the bidding space corresponds to all dyadic rationals of order<;
• there are two players; the second player has a bidding distribution according to the perturbed
instance ( (~) ;
• the rst player has a valuation of 1.
Notice that we can indeed construct this auction in polynomial time. In particular, there is an
algorithm that computes Π( (~) (1) as follows. If 1 ≥ 1/2, then Π( (~) (1) = 1. Otherwise, write 1 in
the form 0G1112; decide whether G ∈ ( (~) (in polynomial time); depending on the answer, compute
Π( (~) (1) according to the formulas above.
To complete the proof, suppose ~ is a no-instance. en Π( (~) = Π∅ = Π, and the best-response for
player 1 in this auction must achieve utility of exactly 1/2, so that any Y-best-response achieves utility
at most 1/2. On the other hand, suppose ~ is a yes-instance. en ( (~) ≠ ∅, and the best-response for
player 1 in this auction must achieve utility strictly higher than 1/2 + 2−< , so that any Y-best-response
achieves utility strictly higher than 1/2. 
C Exact Equilibria Can be Irrational
In this section we provide the technical details on Example 1, which shows that a FPA can have only
irrational equilibria. Recall that in Section 2 we imposed two standard assumptions in the literature,
namely that equilibrium strategies are monotone non-decreasing and exhibit no overbidding. Here, since
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we would like to argue that all equilibria are irrational, to make our statement even stronger, we will
show that in the example that we construct, there is a unique equilibrium which is irrational, but also
in non-decreasing strategies and in which the bidders are not overbidding.
To this end, we start with the following proposition that states that essentially, violations of
overbidding and monotonicity only occur in trivial corner cases. In our subsequent construction, such
cases will not occur.
Proposition C.1. Let # be an exact equilibrium of a FPA. For a bid 18 by player 8 , let 8 (18 , #−8) denote
the (perceived) probability that player 8 gets the item, given this bid and the bidding strategies by the other
players. en, strategies will always be no over-bidding and monotone non-decreasing except only possibly
when the probability of winning is zero. Formally,
1. let E8 be a valuation by player 8 and 18 = V8 (E8). If 18 > E8 , then 8 (18 , #−8) = 0;
2. let E8 , E ′8 be valuations by player 8 and 18 = V8 (E8), 1 ′8 = V8 (E ′8 ). If E8 < E ′8 and 18 > 1 ′8 , then
8 (18 , #−8) = 8 (1 ′8 , #−8) = 0.
Proof.
1. If 18 > E8 and 8 (18 , #−8) > 0, then player 8 achieves a strictly negative utility by bidding 18 when
her valuation is E8 . However, player 8 could achieve non-negative utility by bidding below E8 (e.g.
by bidding 0). Hence # would not be an equilibrium.
2. Suppose that E8 < E
′
8 and 18 > 1
′
8 . As # is an exact equilibrium, we know that 18 , 1
′
8 are the best
bidding responses by player 8 . In other words, D8 (18 , #−8 ; E8) ≥ D8 (1 ′8 , #−8 ; E8) and D8 (1 ′8 , #−8 ; E ′8 ) ≥
D8 (18 , #−8 ; E ′8 ). Moreover, as 18 > 1 ′8 we also know that 8 (18 , #−8) ≥ 8 (1 ′8 , #−8). Puing these
together, we nd that
D8 (18 , #−8 ; E ′8 ) + D8 (1 ′8 , #−8 ; E8) = (E ′8 − 18)8 (18 , #−8) + (E8 − 1 ′8 )8 (1 ′8 , #−8)
= (E ′8 − E8)8 (18 , #−8) + (E8 − 18)8 (18 , #−8) + (E8 − 1 ′8 )8 (1 ′8 , #−8)
≥ (E ′8 − E8)8 (1 ′8 , #−8) + (E8 − 18)8 (18 , #−8) + (E8 − 1 ′8 )8 (1 ′8 , #−8)
= (E ′8 − 1 ′8 )8 (1 ′8 , #−8) + (E8 − 18)8 (18 , #−8)
= D8 (1 ′8 , #−8 ; E ′8 ) + D8 (18 , #−8 ; E8) .
From this, we conclude that all steps in the above derivation must hold with equality, implying
that D8 (18 , #−8 ; E8) = D8 (1 ′8 , #−8 ; E8), D8 (1 ′8 , #−8 ; E ′8 ) = D8 (18 , #−8 ; E ′8 ) and 8 (18 , #−8) = 8 (1 ′8 , #−8).
But then 0 = D8 (1 ′8 , #−8 ; E8) − D8 (18 , #−8 ; E8) = (18 − 1 ′8 )8 (18 , #−8). As 18 > 1 ′8 we conclude that
8 (18 , #−8) = 8 (1 ′8 , #−8) = 0.

We are now ready to proceed with the example showing that all equilibria of the FPA can be
irrational. Consider a rst-price auction with = = 3 bidders and common priors, whose valuations
are independently and identically distributed according to the uniform distribution on [0, 1]; that is,
8 (G) = G for 8 = 1, 2, 3. Let the bidding space be  = {0, 1/2}. Clearly, this auction can be represented
with piecewise-constant density functions (with a single piece) and with a nite number of rational
quantities. We shall show that the auction has a unique equilibrium, and that this equilibrium is
described by an irrational jump point.
First observe that, at an exact equilibrium, the probability of a player winning when bidding 0 is
positive. Otherwise, both of the other players would be bidding 1/2 with probability 1, and would achieve
expected negative utility when having a valuation in [0, 1/2), which contradicts the best-response
conditions. Since the probability of winning is never zero, Proposition C.1 implies that any equilibrium
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must consist of non-overbidding, monotone non-decreasing strategies. In particular, the best response
strategy of a player 8 can be described by a single jump point 08 , that is,
V8 (G) =
{
0 if 0 ≤ G ≤ 08 ;
1/2 if 08 < G ≤ 1.
Since strategies are non-overbidding, we must have that 1/2 ≤ 08 ≤ 1. Moreover, a joint strategy
prole can be described by the jump points of each player, which form a triple (01, 02, 03).
Next we show that, at an exact equilibrium, each of the 08 must be strictly less than 1. Suppose that
bidder 1 has a valuation of E1 and that bidders 2 and 3 have played according to (02, 03). is means
that bidder 2 bids 0 with probability 02 and bids 1/2 with probability (1 − 02), and similarly for bidder 3.
us, the probability of player 1 winning when bidding 0 or when bidding 1/2 is, respectively,




 (1/2;02, 03) = 0203 +
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From this we can compute the utility of player 1 when bidding 0 or when bidding 1/2,























We can compute the jump point E1 for which player 1 is indierent between bidding 0 or bidding
1/2, by solving the equation
































2 + 02 + 03
. (21)
Next observe that the expression
0203
2+02+0+3 is increasing in both 02 and 03; hence, by seing 02 = 1,







. In other words, the break-even
point must occur in the interval [1/2, 3/4], and thus in particular seing E1 = 01 must give a solution to
(20).
Repeating this argument for players 2 and 3 we obtain similarly that 02 and 03 must lie in [1/2, 3/4],
and that these jump points must be the solutions of equations similar to (20). In order for (01, 02, 03)
to dene an equilibrium, each player’s jump point must be optimal in response to the other players’
strategies. us, (01, 02, 03) must be a solution of the system of equations






















Finally, we show that the above system has a unique solution. By subtracting (23) from (22), we get










(01 − 02) = 0
⇒ 03 = −
5
4
or 01 = 02.
Since we know that 03 ∈ [1/2, 3/4], we conclude that 01 = 02. By the same argument, we must have
02 = 03 and 01 = 03, that is, any equilibrium must be symmetric. Now leing 0 := 01 = 02 = 03, we get
that 0 must be a solution to the equation





⇒ 02 + 0 − 1 = 0





Since 0 must be positive, we conclude that the unique equilibrium of this auction is given by the





≈ 0.618 (the inverse of the golden ratio), which is irrational.
D Proof of Lemma 4.3
Since the distributions are polynomially-continuous, it follows that given any Y > 0, we can compute
X > 0 in polynomial time such that |8, 9 (G) −8, 9 (~) | ≤ Y/2=+1 for all G,~ with |G −~ | ≤ X and all 8, 9 ∈ #
(8 ≠ 9 ).
Consider any " ," ′ ∈ D (see the proof of eorem 4.1) with ‖" − " ′‖∞ ≤ X . en, we have PrE8∼ 9,8 [V8 (E8) ≤ 1] − PrE8∼ 9,8 [V ′8 (E8) ≤ 1]
 ≤  PrE8∼ 9,8 [E8 ≤ U8 (1)] − PrE8∼ 9,8 [E8 ≤ U ′8 (1)]

≤
 9,8 (U8 (1)) −  9,8 (U ′8 (1))
≤ Y/2=+1
for all 8, 9 ∈ # (8 ≠ 9 ) and 1 ∈ . It follows that PrE8∼ 9,8 [V8 (E8) < 1] diers from PrE8∼ 9,8
[
V ′8 (E8) < 1
]
by at most Y/2=+1. Similarly, PrE8∼ 9,8 [V8 (E8) = 1] diers from PrE8∼ 9,8
[
V ′8 (E8) = 1
]
by at most Y/2= .
Let )8 (1, ℓ ;"−8) denote the probability that, from the perspective of bidder 8 , exactly ℓ out of the
bidders # \ {8} bid exactly 1, and the remaining = − 1 − ℓ bidders bid below 1. We can write








[V: (E: ) = 1]
∏
:∈# \( {8 }∪()
Pr
E:∼8,:
[V: (E: ) < 1] .





=Y/2= , for all 8 ∈ # , 1 ∈ 
and ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , = − 1}. As dened in Section 3, recall that 8 (1,"−8) denotes the probability that





ℓ + 1)8 (1, ℓ ;"−8) .


















for all 8 ∈ # and 1 ∈ . Finally, note that D8 (1,"−8 ; E8) = 8 (1,"−8) · (E8 − 1). us, we obtainD8 (1,"−8 ; E8) − D8 (1," ′−8 ; E8) ≤ 8 (1,"−8) − 8 (1," ′−8) |E8 − 1 | ≤ Y
for all 8 ∈ # , 1 ∈  and E8 ∈ [0, 1], since |E8 − 1 | ≤ 1.
E PPAD and FIXP-completeness of Generalized Circuit Variants
E.1 PPAD-completeness (Proof of Proposition 5.3)
Membership in PPAD follows from the fact that a generalized circuit with gates 61, . . . , 6m can be
interpreted as dening an arithmetic circuit  : [0, 1]m → [0, 1]m, where for G ∈ [0, 1]m and 8 ∈ [m]
we let 8 (G) =  (G 9 , G: ), where 68 = (, 9, :). en, it is known that the problem of computing an
Y-approximate xed point of such a function  lies in PPAD [Etessami and Yannakakis, 2010] (and in
fact, even when Y is provided in the input in binary representation). Finally, note that an Y-approximate
xed point of  exactly corresponds to an Y-satisfying assignment for the generalized circuit.
In order to prove PPAD-hardness, consider the Y-Gcircuit problem with gate-types G = {1−,+},
for some suciently small constant Y > 0 (which will be set later). We begin by showing that additional
gate-types can be simulated if we allow a larger (but still constant) error.
M=: Copy. e goal of such a gate is to copy the value of some gate 61. For this, we use the fact that
1 − (1 − G) = G . us, we introduce a gate 62 of type 1− with input 61 and a gate 63 of type 1− with
input 62. It holds that v[63] = 1 − v[62] ± Y = v[61] ± 2Y. In other words, we can simulate a copy gate
with error at most 2Y.
M1: Constant 1. In order to obtain a gate that has value 1, we use the fact that G + (1 − G) = 1. First,
we introduce an arbitrary gate 61. en, we introduce a gate 62 of type 1− with input 61, and a gate
63 of type + with inputs 61 and 62. It holds that v[63] = T(v[61] + v[62]) ± Y = 1 ± 2Y. us, we can
simulate a constant 1 with error at most 2Y.
M−: Subtraction. e goal of this gate is to compute T(v[61] − v[62]). For this, we use the identity
T(G − ~) = 1 − T
(
(1 − G) + ~
)
which allows us to express subtraction using only addition and the complement operation. With this in
hand, we can implement subtraction as follows. We introduce a gate 63 of type1− with input 61, a gate
64 of type + with inputs 63 and 62, and nally a gate 65 of type 1− with input 64. en, it holds that
v[65] = 1−v[64] ± Y = 1−T(v[63] +v[62]) ± 2Y = 1−T(1−v[61] +v[62]) ± 3Y = T(v[61] −v[62]) ± 3Y.
us, we can simulate a subtraction gate with error at most 3Y.
M/2: Division by 2. e goal of this gate is to compute v[61]/2. is is achieved by constructing a
cycle. Namely, we introduce two gates 62 and 63. e gate 62 is of type − with inputs 61 and 63, and
the gate 63 is of type = with input 62. As a result, it holds that
v[63] = v[62] ± 2Y = T(v[61] − v[63]) ± 5Y.
From this, it follows that v[63] = v[61]/2 ± 5Y. To see this, note that if v[63] ≥ v[61], then v[63] =
0± 5Y = v[61]/2± 5Y, since [0, 5Y] ⊆ [v[61]/2− 5Y, v[61]/2 + 5Y] (because v[61]/2 ≤ v[63]/2 ≤ 5Y). On
the other hand, if v[63] < v[61], then we obtain that 2v[63] = v[61] ± 5Y, which again yields the same
conclusion, namely v[63] = v[61]/2 ± 5Y. us, we can simulate division by 2 with error at most 5Y.
M×' : Multiplication by ' ∈ [0, 1]. If Z = 0, then we can simply output 1−(1) = 0 ± 3Y. If Z = 1,
we can simply use a = gate that has error at most 2Y. Consider now the case where Z ∈ (0, 1). Let
: = dlog
2
(1/Y)e. Recall that Y will be a xed constant, so : will also be a xed constant. It is easy to
see that in polynomial time (in the representation size of Z ) we can nd 0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2: − 1} such that
|Z − 0/2: | ≤ Y.
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Let 61 denote the input. Our goal now is to compute (0/2: ) · v[61], since this will be Y-close to
Z · v[61]. We compute (0/2: ) · v[61] in a careful manner to ensure that the error remains small. is is




, 08 ∈ {0, 1}, we can express the












We implement this as follows. First, introduce 62 such that v[62] = v[61]/2 ± 5Y. Next, introduce 63
such that (i) if 00 = 0, then v[63] = 0 ± 3Y, (ii) if 00 = 1, then 63 = 62. In both cases we have
v[63] = 00v[62] ± 3Y.
Next, introduce 64 such that (i) if 01 = 0, then v[64] = v[63]/2 ± 5Y = 00v[62]/2 ± 5(1 + 1/2)Y, (ii) if
01 = 1, then v[64] = v[63]/2 + v[62] ± 6Y = 00v[62]/2 + v[62] ± 6(1 + 1/2)Y. In both cases we have
v[64] = 00v[62]/2 + 01v[62] ± 6(1 + 1/2)Y = (00 + 201)v[62]/2 ± 6(1 + 1/2)Y.
Next, introduce 65 such that (i) if 02 = 0, then v[65] = v[64]/2±5Y = (00+201)v[62]/4±6(1+1/2+1/4)Y,
(ii) if 02 = 1, then v[65] = v[64]/2 + v[62] ± 6Y = (00 + 201)v[62]/4 + v[62] ± 6(1 + 1/2 + 1/4)Y. In both
cases we have
v[65] = (00 + 201)v[62]/4 + 02v[62] ± 6(1 + 1/2 + 1/4)Y
= (00 + 201 + 402)v[62]/4 ± 6(1 + 1/2 + 1/4)Y.
















v[61] ± 22Y = Z · v[61] ± 23Y.
us, we can compute multiplication by Z ∈ [0, 1] with error at most 23Y. Note that this gadget can
be constructed in polynomial time in the representation size of Z . Furthermore, the number of gates
needed to construct the gadget is $ (:), which is constant, since : = dlog
2
(1/Y)e and Y will be a xed
constant.
We are now ready to show PPAD-hardness. To do this, we reduce from a slightly modied version of
Gcircuit studied by Goldberg et al. [2020], that we call Gcircuit
[−1,1]
. is modied version operates





×−Z (where the gates truncate
to [−1, 1], and Z ∈ [0, 1]). Goldberg et al. [2020] proved that Y ′-Gcircuit[−1,1] is PPAD-hard for some
suciently small constant Y ′ > 0. We now set Y := Y ′/50. Below, we show that Y ′-Gcircuit[−1,1] reduces
to Y-Gcircuit (with gate-types G = {1−,+}).







×−Z , we construct a corresponding
circuit with gates 1− and + as follows. Every gate 6 of the original circuit is replaced by two gates 6+
and 6−. e idea is that the value of 6, which lies in [−1, 1], will be encoded by the values of 6+ and 6−,
which lie in [0, 1]. Formally, we interpret v[6] := v[6+] − v[6−]. Next, we show that the constraints of
the original circuit can be enforced by corresponding constraints on the new circuit.
Simulating M[−1,1]1 . In order to enforce that v[6] = 1 ± Y ′, we proceed as follows. We simply let
v[6+] = 1 ± 2Y and v[6−] = 0 ± 3Y (using the constructions described above). us, it holds that
v[6] = v[6+] − v[6−] = 1 ± 5Y = 1 ± Y ′.
Simulating M[−1,1]
×−' . In order to enforce that v[62] = −Z · v[61] ± Y
′
, for some Z ∈ [0, 1], we proceed
as follows. Using the constructions described above, we can enforce that v[6+
2
] = Z · v[6−
1
] ± 23Y and
v[6−
2
] = Z · v[6+
1
] ± 23Y. us, v[62] = −Z · v[61] ± 46Y = −Z · v[61] ± Y ′.
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Simulating M[−1,1]+ . In order to enforce that v[63] = T[−1,1] (v[61] + v[62]) ± Y ′, we proceed in two













]) ± 3Y, which yields v[ℎ1] = v[61] ± 6Y. We
similarly obtain ℎ2 from 62. is “normalization” will ensure that addition is then performed correctly.





]) ± Y. us, it holds that
v[63] = v[6+3 ] − v[6−3 ] = T(v[ℎ+1 ] + v[ℎ+2 ]) − T(v[ℎ−1 ] + v[ℎ−2 ]) ± 2Y
= T[−1,1] (v[ℎ+1 ] + v[ℎ+2 ]) − T[−1,1] (v[ℎ−1 ] + v[ℎ−2 ]) ± 2Y.










In the case where v[ℎ−
1
] ≤ 3Y and v[ℎ−
2
] ≤ 3Y, it holds that v[ℎ1] = v[ℎ+1 ] ± 3Y and v[ℎ2] = v[ℎ+2 ] ± 3Y,
which implies that
v[63] = T[−1,1] (v[ℎ1] + v[ℎ2]) − T[−1,1] (v[ℎ−1 ] + v[ℎ−2 ]) ± 8Y = T[−1,1] (v[ℎ1] + v[ℎ2]) ± 14Y.
In the case where v[ℎ+
1
] ≤ 3Y and v[ℎ−
2
] ≤ 3Y, it holds that v[ℎ1] = −v[ℎ−1 ] ± 3Y and v[ℎ2] = v[ℎ+2 ] ± 3Y,
which implies that
v[63] = T[−1,1] (v[ℎ+1 ] + v[ℎ2]) − T[−1,1] (−v[ℎ1] + v[ℎ−2 ]) ± 8Y = v[ℎ1] + v[ℎ2] ± 14Y
= T[−1,1] (v[ℎ1] + v[ℎ2]) ± 14Y.
e remaining two cases are handled in the same way, and thus we always obtain that
v[63] = T[−1,1] (v[ℎ1] + v[ℎ2]) ± 14Y = T[−1,1] (v[61] + v[62]) ± 26Y = T[−1,1] (v[61] + v[62]) ± Y ′.
Clearly, this construction can be performed in polynomial time in the size of the original generalized
circuit. Furthermore, given any Y-satisfying assignment of the new generalized circuit, we can easily
obtain an Y ′-satisfying assignment of the original generalized circuit by seing v[6] := v[6+] − v[6−] ∈
[−1, 1] for all gates 6. It follows that the Y-Gcircuit problem with gate-types G = {1−,+} is PPAD-
hard.
Finally, note that if we let G = {1,−} instead, we again obtain the same result, because 1− and
+ can easily be simulated. Indeed, it is clear that 1− can immediately be simulated. Furthermore, +
can be simulated by using the equation T(G + ~) = 1 − T((1 − G) − ~).
E.2 FIXP-completeness (Proof of Proposition 5.4)
Membership in FIXP follows immediately by noting that a generalized circuit with gates 61, . . . , 6m
denes an arithmetic circuit  : [0, 1]m → [0, 1]m, where for G ∈ [0, 1]m and 8 ∈ [m] we let
8 (G) =  (G 9 , G: ), where 68 = (, 9, :). Indeed, any xed point of  corresponds to an assignment that
exactly satises the gate constraints. In particular, note that all the gate-types we consider can be
exactly computed using the usual operations allowed in FIXP, namely +,×,max and rational constants.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that this trivially yields an SL-reduction [Etessami and Yannakakis, 2010].
In order to prove FIXP-hardness we will show that our very restricted set of gates is actually enough
to simulate various more complex gates. Deligkas et al. [2021, Section 7.2], using a special Brouwer
function for the FIXP-complete problem 3-Nash given by Etessami and Yannakakis [2010], proved that
computing xed points of very restricted arithmetic circuits is already FIXP-hard. In more detail, they
consider functions  : [0, 1]= → [0, 1]= computed by circuits with a restricted set of gates and such that
every gate always has value in [0, 1], for any input G ∈ [0, 1]= to the circuit. Because of this property
we can use our gates that truncate to [0, 1] without changing any of the computations.
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In more detail, they allow the following gates: Z (constant Z ∈ ℚ ∩ [0, 1]), +, − (subtraction
truncated to [0, 1]), ×,  [0,1]×2 , max and min. We show below that we can simulate all of these gates,
using only the gates 1−, ×2 and × (or alternatively, 1−, + and  ( ·)2 ). In particular, 
[0,1]
×2 is a
restricted gate ×2 that only works on inputs in [0, 1/2]. Since our ×2 gate has the same behavior as
that gate for such inputs, it is correctly simulated.
Finally, we simply use copy gates= to enforce the xed point constraint, namely that the 8th input
to  be equal to its 8th output. It is easy to see that this construction yields a polynomial-time reduction,
and that it is in fact an SL-reduction [Etessami and Yannakakis, 2010], since we only need to extract the
values assigned to the input gates in order to obtain a xed point of  . In the remainder of this proof,
we show how all the required gates can be simulated using our restricted set of gates 1−, ×2 and×.
M=: Copy. In order to copy the value of some gate 61, we use the complement gate 1− twice. Namely,
we rst introduce a gate 62 of type 1− with input 61, and then another gate 63 of type 1− with input
62. Clearly it holds that v[63] = 1 − v[62] = 1 − (1 − v[61]) = v[61].
M1/2: Constant 1/2. In order to obtain a gate that has value 1/2, we create a small cycle. We introduce
two gates 61 and 62. e gate 61 is of type= with input 62, and the gate 62 is of type1− with input 61.
It follows that v[61] satises v[61] = 1 − v[61], which implies v[61] = 1/2. Note that together with the
× gate we can now also perform multiplication by 1/2, denoted by ×1/2.
M−: Subtraction. In the proof of Lemma 5.5, we show how to construct a subtraction gate given access
only to 1−, ×2 and a special gate q , where q : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1], (G,~) ↦→ (G + 1) (~ + 1)/4. us, to
obtain the subtraction gate, it is enough for us here to construct a gate q . Since we have access to ×,
it suces to construct a gate that implements the function G ↦→ (G + 1)/2. Let 61 be the input gate. We
introduce a gate 62 of type1− with input 61, a gate 63 of type×1/2 with input 62, and nally a gate 64 of
type1− with input 63. It follows that v[64] = 1−v[63] = 1−v[62]/2 = 1−(1−v[61])/2 = (v[61] +1)/2,
as desired.
M+: Addition. Addition can easily be obtained from subtraction by using the following equality for all
G,~ ∈ [0, 1]
T(G + ~) = 1 − T((1 − G) − ~) = 1−(−(1−(G), ~)) .
Mmax, Mmin: Maximum and Minimum. e function (G,~) ↦→ max{G,~} can easily be simulated with
existing gates by noting that
max{G,~} = T(G + T(~ − G)) = +(G,−(~, G)) .
en, (G,~) ↦→ min{G,~} can simply be obtained by min{G,~} = 1 −max{1 − G, 1 − ~}.





, where 08 ∈ {0, 1}. Our goal is to construct a gate that computes G ↦→ T(: · G). Using the
×2 gate we can compute T(28 · G) for 8 = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ . is requires ℓ separate ×2 gates. en, we use













= T(: · G) .
is uses at most ℓ separate + gates. us, overall we use a number of gates that is polynomial in the
representation length of : .
M' : Constant ' ∈ [0, 1] ∩ ℚ. If Z = 1, we can simply do ×2(1/2) = 1. If Z = 0, we can do
1−(×2(1/2)) = 0. Now assume that Z ∈ (0, 1). Write Z = 2/3 where 2 and 3 are positive integers,
2 ≥ 1, 2 < 3 , 3 ≥ 2. Clearly, if we can construct the constant 1/3 , then we can use a×: gate with : = 2
to obtain Z . In order to construct 1/3 , we use a small cycle. We introduce two gates 61 and 62. e gate
61 is of type ×: with : = 3 − 1 and with input 62. e gate 62 is of type 1− with input 61. us, it
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holds that v[62] = 1 − v[61] = 1 − T((3 − 1) · v[62]). It is easy to check that the only solution of this
equation is v[62] = 1/3 .
Finally, let us show that the set of gate-types 1−, + and  ( ·)2 also suces to simulate all the gates
above, by showing that they can simulate 1−, ×2 and ×. As before, 1− can be used to create =.
en, + and = can be used to obtain ×2. us, it remains to simulate ×.
Note that − can be obtained by T(G − ~) = 1 − (T((1 − G) + ~)). Furthermore, we can construct
×1/2 on input gate 61 as follows. We introduce two gates 62 and 63. e gate 62 is of type − and has
inputs 61 and 63. e gate 63 is of type= with input 62. It follows that v[63] = T(v[61] − v[63]), which
has the only solution v[63] = v[61]/2.






= (G/2)2 + (~/2)2 + G~/2.
We can easily compute G/2 + ~/2 and then square using  ( ·)2 . Similarly, we can also compute (G/2)2 +
(~/2)2. By using −, we then obtain G~/2, and thus G~ aer using a ×2 gate.
E.3 Proof of Lemma 5.5
In order to prove that the problem remains hard with G = {×2,1−,q }, we will show that other
gate-types can be simulated using only these three gate-types. Let Y ∈ [0, 1/14] and assume that we
have access to gates of type ×2, 1− and q .









3(G + 1) (~ + 1)/4
)
≥ T(2) = 1.
In more detail, we use a gate 61 of typeq (with arbitrary inputs), then a gate 62 of type×2 with input
61, another gate 63 of type ×2 with input 62, and nally another gate 64 of type ×2 with input 63. We
have that v[61] ≥ 1/4 − Y, v[62] ≥ T(2 · v[61]) − Y ≥ 1/2 − 3Y, v[63] ≥ T(2 · v[62]) − Y ≥ 1 − 7Y, and
v[64] ≥ T(2 · v[63]) − Y ≥ 1 − Y, since Y ≤ 1/14. us, we can construct a gate that has the value 1 ± Y.
M/2: Division by 2. In order to divide the value of some gate 61 by 2, we use the fact that
1 − q (1 − v[61], 1) = 1 − (2 − v[61]) (1 + 1)/4 = v[61]/2.
In more detail, we use a gate 62 of type 1− with input 61, then we use a gate 63 of type q with
inputs 62 and a constant 1 ± Y, and nally we use a gate 64 of type 1− with input 63. It holds that
v[62] = 1−v[61]±Y, v[63] = q (v[62], 1±Y)±Y = 1−v[61]/2±2Y, and v[64] = 1−v[63]±Y = v[61]/2±3Y.
us, we can construct a gate that performs division by 2 with error at most 3Y.
M=: Copy. It is easy to see that using two gates of type 1−, one aer the other, copies the original
value with error at most 2Y.
Minv : Inverse. We now show how to construct the gate 8=E , which computes the function G ↦→
−1 + 4/(2 + G), and will be very useful to construct the subtraction gate below. e construction of8=E
uses a cycle. Let 61 be the input gate. We rst use a gate 62 of type1− with input 61, then we use a gate
63 of type q with input 62 and 64, and nally we let gate 64 be of type = with input 63. We have that
v[62] = 1 − v[61] ± Y, v[63] = q (v[62], v[64]) ± Y, and v[64] = v[63] ± 2Y. It follows that v[64] must
satisfy the equation











± 8Y = −1 + 4
2 + v[61]
± 8Y
i.e., we can compute the function with error at most 8Y.
M−: Subtraction. Given gates 61 and 62, we want to obtain T(v[61] − v[62]). To achieve this, we rst
























(~ − G) .
In more detail, we rst use a gate 63 of type8=E with input 62, then a gate 64 of type1− with input 61,
then a gate 65 of typeq with inputs 63 and 64, then a gate 66 of type/2 with input 62, and nally a gate
67 of typeq with inputs65 and66. We thus obtain that v[63] = −1+4/(2+v[62])±8Y, v[64] = 1−v[61]±Y,
and v[65] = (2 − v[61]) (2 + v[62]) ± 7Y. Furthermore, it holds that v[66] = v[62]/2 ± 3Y, and thus
v[67] = 1/2 + (v[62] − v[61])/8 ± 11Y.
























= T(G − ~).
is is implemented by using a gate 68 of type ×2 with input 67, then a gate 69 of type 1− with input
68, then a gate 610 of type ×2 with input 69, and nally another gate 611 of type ×2 with input 610. It
holds that
v[68] = T(2 · v[67]) ± Y = 1 − T(v[61] − v[62])/4 ± 23Y.
As a result, it then holds that v[69] = T(v[61] − v[62])/4± 24Y, v[610] = T(v[61] − v[62])/2± 49Y, and
nally v[611] = T(v[61] − v[62]) ± 99Y. us, we can compute subtraction with error at most 99Y.
M×: Multiplication. Given gates 61 and 62, we want to obtain v[61] · v[62]. We only perform the
construction for the case Y = 0, since we only need this gate for the FIXP-hardness. Note that we can
multiply by 4 using two consecutive ×2 gates. Similarly, we can divide by 4 using two consecutive /2
gadgets. To perform multiplication, we use the fact that










In more detail, we rst use a gate 63 of type q with input 61 and 62, then a gate 64 of type /4 with
input the constant 1, then a gate 65 of type − with inputs 63 and 64, then a gate 66 of type /4 with
input 61, then a gate 67 of type− with inputs 65 and 66, then a gate 68 of type/4 with input 62, then a
gate 69 of type − with inputs 67 and 68, and nally a gate 610 of type ×4 with input 69. We have that
v[63] = q (v[61], v[62]) = (v[61] + v[62] + v[61] · v[62] + 1)/4.
en we obtain that v[65] = (v[61] + v[62] + v[61] · v[62])/4, v[67] = (v[62] + v[61] · v[62])/4,
v[69] = v[61] · v[62]/4, and nally v[610] = v[61] · v[62]. us, we can perform exact multiplication
when Y = 0.
Hardness. We have shown that we can simulate gates 1 and − with error at most 99Y. us, by
Proposition 5.3, the PPAD-hardness of our restricted version follows. For the case Y = 0, we have shown
that we can exactly simulate gates×2,1− and×. As a result, by Proposition 5.4, the exact version of
our restricted version is FIXP-hard.
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